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Abstract
There are numerous applications where an agent a needs to reason about the beliefs of an-
other agent, as well as about the actions that other agents may take. In [T. Eiter, V.S. Subrah-
manian, G. Pick, Heterogeneous Active Agents, I: Semantics, Artificial Intelligence 108 (1–2)
(1999) 179–255] the concept of an agent program is introduced, and a language within which
the operating principles of an agent can be declaratively encoded on top of imperative data
structures is defined. In this paper we first introduce certain belief data structures that an agent
needs to maintain. Then we introduce the concept of a Meta Agent Program (map), that ex-
tends the framework of Refs. [T. Eiter, V.S. Subrahmanian, Heterogeneous Active Agents,
II: Algorithms and Complexity, Artificial Intelligence 108 (1–2) (1999) 257–307; loc. cit.] so
as to allow agents to perform metareasoning. We build a formal semantics for maps, and show
how this semantics supports not just beliefs agent a may have about agent b ’s state, but also
beliefs about agents b ’s beliefs about agent c ’s actions, beliefs about b ’s beliefs about agent
c ’s state, and so on. Finally, we provide a transansation that takes any map as input and con-
verts it into an agent program such that there is a one–one correspondence between the seman-
tics of the map and the semantics of the resulting agent program. This correspondence allows
an implementation of maps to be built on top of an implementation of agent pro-
grams. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Agent programming; Meta reasoning; Beliefs
1. Introduction
Over the last few years, there has been tremendous interest in the area of intelli-
gent software agents. Such agents provide a wide range of services, ranging from
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providing data mediation services [6,4,11,36,14], to mobile agents [45], to personal-
ized visualization agents [12,29], to agents that monitor newspapers, prioritize mail
and the like [27,24,50,47].
Most such existing work on agents subscribes to the view that agents should be
autonomous, and that such autonomous agents should behave according to a clearly
articulated set of operating principles. These operating principles allow agents to take
actions that change the state of the agent in accordance with the principles in Refs.
[43,44]. Declarative languages to encode such operating principles were proposed by
Shoham [48,28]. Recently, in Refs. [21,19], the authors have proposed a notion of an
Agent Program and shown how agent programs can be layered on top of arbitrary
data structures. This allows the creator of an agent to agentize existing bodies of
software code by ‘‘adding on’’ such operating principles on top of the code.
In general, in many multiagent applications, an agent needs to be able to reason
about other agents. Consider, for example, a simple autonomous vehicle a driving in
the left lane of a highway, with another vehicle in the right lane, as shown in Fig. 1.
Vehicle b is in the right lane, slightly ahead of Vehicle a.
• Vehicle a may believe that vehicle b’s turn signal is malfunctioning. This belief
may well be incorrect.
• Vehicle a may also believe that vehicle b is imminently going to cut in front of it.
Based on these two beliefs – the first which is about the state of vehicle b, while the
second is about the actions of vehicle b – vehicle amay decide to slow down by either
depressing the brake or easing up on the accelerator. Of course, things can get even
more complex – for example, vehicle a may believe that vehicle b believes that vehi-
cle c is about to shift to the right lane, etc.
In general, this very simple, everyday example shows that an agent may need to
reason about other agents’ state, beliefs, and potential actions. In most existing agent
languages such as Refs. [48,28,21,19], the notion of an agent state is general enough
to include almost anything. However, the specific needs of agents such as vehicle a in
the above discussion, are not addressed, and in particular, it is assumed that beliefs
will somehow be encoded into the very general notion of state. Our aim in this paper
is to precisely show how this can be done, and we go about it in the following way:
• In Section 2, we present a compelling motivating example, that requires meta-rea-
soning capabilities.
• This paper forms part of the Interactive Maryland Platform for Agents Collaborat-
ing Together (IMPACT) project [5,21,8,19]. In Section 3, we briefly overview the
basic architecture of our IMPACT system, and quickly describe the decision mak-
ing framework of Refs. [21,19].
• The new contributions of this paper start in Section 4. Here, we note that dierent
agents may wish to reason about beliefs in dierent ways. Some may be content
Fig. 1. Autonomous vehicle.
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with reasoning about their beliefs about other agents, instead of their beliefs about
the beliefs of other agents, and so on. We propose a hierarchy of belief languages,
building on top of arbitrary data structures that embody the state of an agent. We
then propose two specific data structures for managing an agent’s beliefs – a belief
table, and a belief semantics table. These are accompanied by corresponding oper-
ators to manipulate these tables. We then introduce the important notion of a
Meta Agent Program (map, for short).
• In Section 5, we study the semantics of maps. We propose a notion of a feasible
belief status set. Intuitively, a set of beliefs that satisfies these feasibility require-
ments is one that a ‘‘sensible’’ agent could hold. We refine this semantics to two
finer grained semantics – namely rational belief status sets, and reasonable belief
status sets, both of which satisfy additional epistemic requirements.
• In Section 6, we provide a transformation that takes a map as input, and converts
it into an ordinary agent program, together with some integrity constraints, as de-
fined in [21,19]. A somewhat complex result shows that the feasible (respectively,
rational, reasonable) belief status sets of the map are in one-one correspondence
with the feasible (respectively, rational, reasonable) status sets (without beliefs)
of the agent program + integrity constraints generated by the transformation.
As techniques to implement agent programs have been undergoing concurrent de-
velopment (see http://www.cs.umd.edu/vs/agent/impact.html for selected
screendumps), this means that once this transformation is implemented, maps
can be computed in much the same way as the feasible, rational, and reasonable
status sets of ordinary agent programs.
2. Motivation: Route and Maneuver Planning (RAMP)
We are building an application to conduct distributed simulations involving route
and maneuver planning over free terrain (RAMP). A simplified version of the RAMP
application that deals with meta-reasoning by agents is described below. This exam-
ple will provide a unifying theme throughout this paper, and will be used to illustrate
the various definitions we introduce.
The RAMP application involves tracking enemy vehicles on the battlefield, and at-
tempting to predict what these enemy agents are likely to do in the future, based on
metaknowledge that we have about them. RAMP is intended to be used in training
and simulation eorts, rather than being deployed on the battlefield. RAMP involves
the following agents.
A set of enemy vehicle agents: These agents move across free terrain, and their mo-
tion is generated by a program that the other agents listed below do not have access
to (though they may have beliefs about this program).
A terrain route planning agent, which reasons with terrain maps stored in the form
of Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED). The terrain route planning agent takes as
input, any DTED map, together with two points on this map, a vehicle type, and
plans an optimal route from the first to the second point for the specified vehicle
type. It also provides a flight path computation service for helicopters, through
which it plans a flight, given an origin, a destination, and a set of constraints spec-
ifying the height at which the helicopters wish to fly. The terrain route planning
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agent is built on top of an existing US ARMY Route planning software package de-
veloped at the Topographic and Engineering Center [7].
A tracking agent, which takes as input, a DTED map, an id assigned to an enemy
agent, and a time point, and produces as output, the location of the enemy agent at
the given point in time (if known) as well as its best guess of what kind of the enemy
agent is.
A coordination agent, that keeps track of current friendly assets. This agent re-
ceives input from various agents (e.g., the tracking agents) and ships requests to
the other agents with a view to determining exactly what target(s) the enemy columns
may be attempting to strike, as well as determining how to nullify the oncoming con-
voy. The situation is complicated by the fact that the agent may have a hard time
determining what the intended attack target is. It may be further complicated by un-
certainty about what kind of vehicle the enemy is using – depending upon the type of
vehicle used, dierent routes may be designated as optimal by the terrain route plan-
ning agent.
A set of helicopter agents, that may receive instructions from the coordination
agent about when and where to attack the enemy vehicles. When such instructions
are received, the helicopter agents contact the terrain route planning agent, and re-
quest a flight path. Such a flight path uses terrain elevation information (e.g., to en-
sure that the helicopter does not fly into the side of a mountain).
The aim of all agents above (except for the enemy agents) is to attack and nullify
the enemy attacking force. To do this, the coordination agent sends requests for in-
formation and analyses to the other friendly agents, as well as instructions to them
specifying actions they must take. It is important to note that the coordination
agent’s actions are based on its beliefs about what the enemy is likely to do. These
beliefs include:
• Beliefs about the type of enemy vehicle type. Each enemy vehicle has an associated
type – for example, one vehicle may be a T-80 tank, the other may be a T-72 tank.
However, the coordination agent may not precisely know the type of a given en-
emy vehicle, due to inaccurate and/or uncertain identification made by the sensing
agent. At any point in time, it has some beliefs about the identity of enemy vehicle.
• Beliefs about intentions of enemy vehicle. The coordination agent must try to guess
what the enemy’s target is. This is doubly dicult, given the fact that the enemy
might be explicitly trying to deceive the RAMP agents. Suppose the tracking agent
starts tracking a given enemy agent at time t0, and the current time is tnow. Then the
tracking agent can provide information about the location of this agent at each in-
stant between time t0 and time tnow. Let ‘i denote the location of one such enemy
agent at time ti, 06 i6 now. The coordination agent believes that the enemy agent
is trying to target one of its assets A1; . . . ;Ak, but does not know which one. It may
ask the terrain route planning agent to plan a route from ‘0 to each of the locations
of A1; . . . ;Ak, and may decide that the intended target is the location whose asso-
ciated route most closely matches the observed initial route taken by the enemy
agent between times t0 and tnow. The coordination agent may even allow for poten-
tial deception on the part of the enemy agent. For example, it might maintain
probabilities of events of the form ‘‘asset Ai is the intended target of the enemy.’’
As the enemy moves, these probabilities can be constantly updated by the agent.
• Changing beliefs with time. As the enemy agent continues along its route, the co-
ordination agent may be forced to revise its beliefs, as it becomes apparent that
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the actual route being taken by the enemy vehicle is inconsistent with the expected
route. Furthermore, as time proceeds, sensing data provided by the tracking agent
may cause the coordination agent to revise its beliefs about the enemy vehicle
type. As the route planning agent plans routes based on the type of enemy vehicle
being considered, this may cause changes in the predictions made by the terrain
planning agent.
• Beliefs about the enemy agent’s reasoning. The coordination agent may also hold
some beliefs about the enemy agents’ reasoning capabilities (see the Belief-Seman-
tics Table in Definition 22). For instance, with a relatively unsophisticated and dis-
organized enemy whose command and control facilities have been destroyed, it
may believe that the enemy does not know what moves friendly forces are making.
However, in the case of an enemy with viable/strong operational command and
control facilities, it may believe that the enemy does have information on the
moves made by friendly forces – in this case, additional actions to mislead the en-
emy may be required.
A detailed description of all agents and their actions will be given in Appendix B.
3. Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we use A to denote a finite set whose elements are called
agents. Fig. 2 shows the dierent components of an agent. We briefly describe these
components below – for a full description, the reader is referred to Refs. [21,19].
Agent software code: Most existing work on agents has assumed a purely logical
description of agents. However, a fundamental tenet of computer science is that when
storing data, we must choose a data structure that ‘‘best’’ supports the expected
Fig. 2. Overall architecture.
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accesses on that data by the user community in question. Thus, for agents to
eciently deliver services to users, they must be able to work with application spe-
cific data structures, rather than assuming that all data will be logically represented.
Logic must ‘‘build’’ on top of such third part data structures to support dierent
types of intelligent reasoning and decision making.
In addition, agent theorists must support the idea that third party packages be
able to ‘‘play’’ in an agent environment. We expect many existing imperative pro-
grams to be ‘‘extended’’ to become agents (such as ‘‘agentization’’ procedure is de-
scribed in Refs. [21,19]), and as we want agent developers to have maximal
flexibility in their choice of a data structure(s) for their application, we build our
agents on top of arbitrary data structures.
For these two reasons, our theory of agents will be closely coupled to a formal
characterization of a body of software code that an agent a may use. We denote
the piece of software Sa associated with an agent a 2A by a triple
S def TS;FS;CS:
Definition 1 (Software code S  TS;FS;CS). We may characterize the code on
top of which an agent is built as a triple S def TS;FS;CS where:
(1) TS is the set of all data types managed by S,
(2) FS is a set of predefined functions which allow external processes to access (in
principle) the data objects managed by the agent, and
(3) CS is a set of type composition operations. A type composition operator is a
partial n-ary function c which takes as input, types s1; . . . ; sn and yields as output,
a type cs1; . . . ; sn. As c is a partial function, c may only be defined for certain
arguments s1; . . . ; sn, i.e., c is not necessarily applicable on arbitrary types.
When an agent a’s identity is clear from context, we will often abuse notation and
write S instead of Sa. Intuitively, TS is the set of all data types that are managed
by the agent. FS intuitively represents the set of all function calls supported by
package S’s application programmer interface (API). CS is the set of ways of cre-
ating new data types from existing data types.
This characterization of a piece of software code is a well accepted and widely
used specification. For example, the Object Data Management Group’s (ODMG)
standard [13] and the CORBA framework [49] are existing industry standards con-
sistent with this specification.
Message box: The second important component of an agent’s data structures is its
message box. Every agent is required to have a message box data structure, together
with some associated functions that read messages, send messages, etc. The precise
set of such functions is described later on in Example 10.
Belief structures: Every agent maintains a specialized set of data structures called
belief structures. These are the data structures in which the agent maintains its beliefs
about the data other agents have, the way other agents reason, the actions other
agents might take and/or the beliefs of beliefs of other agents about yet other agents.
An important aim of this paper is to define these structures, and to define what core
functions are needed to manipulate these structures so that agents with different belief
reasoning capabilities can be built.
Meta-agent program: An agent program is a concept proposed in Refs. [21,19].
Agent programs encode the operating principles of an agent. This is very important
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because the developer of an agent should have the ability to write a transparent, de-
clarative set of rules that control the actions that an agent takes. Given the fact that
many of these actions physically modify existing data structures, the need to clearly
enforce this is very important. Meta Agent Programs (maps for short) extend the
concept of an agent program so that agents’ operating principles may be influenced
by their beliefs about themselves and/or other agents.
Each agent has a security module that specifies the agent’s associated security
mechanisms, if any – the security module of our system is described in detail in
Ref. [8], and is not discussed in this paper.
Thus, at any given point in time, an agent a is managing a set of application specific
data types, a message box data type, and a set of belief data structures to be specified in
this paper.
Definition 2 (State of an agent). At any given point t in time, the state of an agent,
denoted OSt, is the set of all objects the agent currently has – these types must be
either in the base set of types inTS or must be a type obtained by composition using
the composition operations in TS.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the only way two agents can communicate
with one another is through messaging. There is no loss of generality in this assump-
tion – if two agents share a common workspace, then this workspace can theoretically
be viewed as part of the message boxes of the two agents.
Every agent therefore continuousansy executes the following cycle of operations –
(i) read new messages, (ii) identify a set of actions that must be taken, and (iii) exe-
cute these actions concurrently. Thus, everytime the agent receives a message, its
state changes, and the ‘‘operating principles’’ of the agent tell it (perhaps nondeter-
ministically) what to do. The aim of this paper is to specify how a map determines a
set of actions to take, given a ‘‘current’’ state of the agent, and given a new state
change (i.e., receipt of a message).
Action base: Every agent has an associated set of actions called its action base.
Actions change the state of the agent and perhaps the state of other agents’
msgboxes.
Integrity constraints: Each agent has an associated set of integrity constraints –
only states that satisfy these constraints are considered to be valid or legal states.
Action constraints: Each agent has an associated set of action constraints that de-
fine the circumstances under which certain actions may be concurrently executed.
As at any given point t in time, many sets of actions may be concurrently execut-
able, each agent uses its Meta-Agent Program to determine what actions can be ta-
ken, what actions may not be taken, and what actions the agent must be taken. The
map associated with an agent is a declarative specification of the agents’ decision
policies.
3.1. Code calls and code call atoms
Suppose we consider a body S  TS;FS of software code that an agent is
built on top of. For the agent to perform logical reasoning on top of such third party
data structures and code, the agent must have a language within which it can reason
about the agent state. In this section, we introduce the concept of code calls and code
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call atoms introduced earlier in constraint form first in Ref. [36] (the form used here
was first introduced in Ref. [1]). Code call atoms, and code call conditions defined in
this section form the basic core language that allows an agent to reason about imper-
ative data structures and code bases.
Given any type s 2TS, we assume that there is a set Vars of variable symbols
ranging over s. If X 2 Vars is such a variable symbol, and if s is a complex record
type having fields f1; . . . ; fn, then we require that X:fi be a variable of type si,
where si is the type of field fi. In the same vein, if fi itself has a sub-field g of type
c, then X:fi:g is a variable of type c, and so on. In this case, we call X a root-vari-
able, and the variables X:fi, X:fi:g, etc., path-variables. For any path variable Y of
the form X:path, where X is a root variable, we refer to X as the root of Y, denoted
by rootY; for technical convenience, rootX, where X is a root variable, refers to
itself.
Definition 3 (Code call cc). Suppose S def TS;FS;CS is some software code
and f 2FS is a predefined function with n arguments, and d1; . . . ; dn are objects
or variables such that each di respects the type requirements of the ith argument
of f . Then,
S : f d1; . . . ; dn 
is a code call. A code call is ground if all the di’s are objects.
It is important to note that an agent may provide access to several possible data
sources/software packages. We will often abuse notation and write a : f d1; . . . ; dn
instead of S : f d1; . . . ; dn when the software code that function f is defined in is
clear from context.
In general, as we will see later, code calls are executable when they are ground.
Thus, non-ground code calls must be instantiated prior to attempts to execute them.
In general, each function f 2F has a signature, specifying the types of inputs it
takes, and the types of outputs it produces. Here are some examples of code calls
that are used in the RAMP example:
• heli : setAltitudeAlt ! Bool.
This code call sets helicopter altitude to Alt. It returns true if it succeeds, oth-
erwise it returns false.
• tank : getPos  ! 2DPoint.
This code call determines the current position of the tank.
• route : flightPlanSourcePoint; DestPoint ! SequenceOf3DPoints.
This code call creates a flight plan from point SourcePoint to point
DestPoint. It returns the plan as a sequence of 3D points.
• track : getTypeOfAgentAgentId ! VehicleType; Prob.
This code call determines the type of a vehicular agent whose id is AgentId. It
also returns a number, denoting the probability that the identification is cur-
rent.
• coord : findAttackTimeAndPosAgentId ! Pos; Time; Route; Prob.
This code call tries to create a plan to attack the agent with id AgentId.
The plan returned specifies a position (where the attack will take place), a time
point (when the attack will take place), a route to get there and the probability that
the determination was correct.
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Definition 4 (Code call atom inX; cc). If cc is a code call, and X is either a variable
symbol, or an object of the output type of cc, then inX; cc and not inX; cc are
code call atoms.
It is important to note that not inX; cc has absolutely nothing to do with nega-
tion as failure. not inX; cc succeeds just in case X is not in the set of objects re-
turned by the code call cc.
Definition 5 (Code call condition v). A code call condition v is defined as follows:
(1) Every code call atom is a code call condition.
(2) If s; t are either variables or objects, then s  t is a code call condition.
(3) If s; t are either integers/real valued objects, or are variables over the integers/
reals, then s < t; s > t; sP t; s6 t are code call conditions.
(4) If v1; v2 are code call conditions, then v1 &v2 is a code call condition.
A code call condition satisfying any of the first three criteria above is an atomic
code call condition.
The following is an atomic code call condition. It is satisfied if the position pos is
the current position for the tank agent: inpos; tank : getPos . Here is a more com-
plex code call condition.
inP2; heli : getPos  &
inD; heli : computeDistanceP1; P2 &
inR; heli : getMaxGunRange  &
D < R
If P1 is instantiated, then this code call attempts to check if the helicopter is within
firing range of an enemy site located at P1.
Definition 6 (Safe code call). A code call S : f d1; . . . ; dn is safe if, by definition,
each di is ground. A code call condition v1 & . . . &vn, n P 1 is safe, if, by definition,
there exists a permutation p of v1; . . . ; vn such that for every i  1; . . . ; n the follow-
ing holds:
(1) If vpi has the form s  t or s < t, s6 t , s > t, sP t, then one of s, t (or
both) is either a constant or one of the Xpj’s for j < i; let Xpi denote a possible
new variable;
(2) If vpi is a code call atom inXpi; ccpi or not inXpi; ccpi, then for each
variable Y occurring in ccpi, rootY is from the set frootXpj j j < ig.
It is easily seen that the code call condition immediately preceding this definition
is not safe. The reason for this is that the variable P1 is not instantiated by any of the
in atoms. Had P1 been replaced with a ground term, then the above code call con-
dition would have been safe.
3.2. Integrity constraints IC
In addition to code calls, each agent also has an associated set of Integrity Con-
straints. Agent integrity constraints specify properties that states of the agent must
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satisfy. In particular, if the current state of the agent satisfies these integrity con-
straints, then the agent may not execute actions that cause it to transition to a state
where the integrity constraints are not satisfied.
Definition 7 (Integrity constraints IC). An integrity constraint is an expression of
the form
w) v;
where w is a safe code call condition, and v is an atomic code call condition such that
every root variable in v occurs in w. A set of integrity constraints is denoted by IC.
Here are two examples:
inS; tank : getSpeed  ) S < MaxSpeed
inA; heli : getAltitude  ) A < MaxAltitude
The first integrity constraint says that a tank’s speed can never exceed its maximum
speed, while the second says that a helicopter’s altitude can never exceed its maxi-
mum flying altitude.
3.3. Actions
Every agent’s actions are completely determined by three parameters that the in-
dividual creating the agent must specify:
AB: an Action Base, specifying a set of actions that the agent can execute (under
the right conditions),
AC: a set of Action Constraints that specify, for example, mutual exclusion be-
tween actions, etc.
P: an Agent Program that determines which of the (instances of) actions in the
agent base the agent is obligated, permitted, or forbidden to execute, together with
a mechanism to actually determine what actions will be taken.
3.3.1. Action base AB
In this section, we introduce the concept of an action and describe how the eects
of actions are implemented.
Definition 8 (Action; action atom). An action a consists of six components:
Name: A name, usually written aX1; . . . ; Xn, where the Xi’s are root variables.
Schema: A schema, usually written as s1; . . . ; sn, of types. Intuitively, this says
that the variable Xi must be of type si, for all 16 i6 n.
Code: This is a body of code that executes the action. Although this is a very im-
portant component, it is not needed for the declarative meaning of the action and
therefore it is suppressed in the sequel.
Pre: A code call condition v, called the precondition of the action, denoted by
Prea (Prea must be safe modulo the variables X1; . . . ; Xn).
Add: A set Adda of code call conditions.
Del: A set Dela of code call conditions.
An action atom is a formula at1; . . . ; tn, where ti is a term, i.e., an object or a vari-
able, of type si for all i  1; . . . ; n.
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The precondition Prea must be safe modulo the variables X1; . . . ; Xn. This means
that Prea is a safe code call condition if every variable Y in Prea such that
rootY 2 fXi j 16 i6 ng were considered as an instantiated object (constant) from
the domain. Furthermore, every code call condition v in Adda [ Dela must be
safe modulo the union of X1; . . . ; Xn and the root variables Y1; . . . ; Ym occurring in
Prea, i.e., it is safe if every variable Y in v such that rootY 2 fX1 . . . ; Xn;
Y1; . . . ; Ymg were considered as though it were a constant.
An action atom is a formula at1; . . . ; tn, where ti is a term, i.e., an object or a vari-
able, of type si for all i  1; . . . ; n.
Let us now consider some examples of action and their associated descriptions in
the case of the RAMP example described at the beginning of this paper.
Example 9 (Some actions of RAMP agents). We describe some actions of the Heli-
copter, Tank, Route and Coordination-Agents:
Helicopter Agent:
FlyFrom; To; Altitude; Speed
Pre : inFrom; heli : getPos 
Del : inFrom; heli : getPos 
Add : inTo; heli : getPos 
Tank Agent:
driveFrom; To; Speed
Pre : inFrom; tank : getPos 
Del : inFrom; tank : getPos 
Add : inTo; tank : getPos 
Route Agent:
planRouteMap; SourcePoint; DestPoint; VehicleType
Pre : SourcePoint 6 DestPoint
Del : fg
Add : intrue; route : useMapMap&
inPlan; route : getPlanSourcePoint; DestPoint; VehicleType
Coordination Agent:
attackSetOfAgentIds; EnemyId
Pre : SetOfAgentIds 6 fg
Del : fg
Add : inAP; coord : coordinatedAttackSetOfAgentIds; EnemyId
Example 10 (Message box). Throughout this paper, we assume that each agent’s as-
sociated software code includes a special type called Msgbox (short for message box).
The message box is a buer that may be filled (when it sends a message) or flushed
(when it reads the message) by the agent. In addition, we assume the existence of an
operating-systems level messaging protocol (e.g., SOCKETS or TCP/IP [52]) that
can fill in (with incoming messages) or flush (when a message is physically sent-
o) this buer. The msgbox operates on objects of the form ı=o; ‘‘src’’, ‘‘dest’’, ‘‘mes-
sage’’, ‘‘time’’). The parameter ı=o signifies an incoming or outgoing message,
respectively. The variable ‘‘src’’ specifies the originator of the message whereas
‘‘dest’’ specifies the destination. The ‘‘message’’ is a table consisting of triples of
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the form (‘‘varName’’, ‘‘varType’’, ‘‘value’’) where ‘‘varName’’ is the name of the
variable, ‘‘varType’’ is the type of the variable and the ‘‘value’’ is the value of the
variable in string format. Finally, ‘‘time’’ denotes the time at which the message
was sent.
We will assume that the agent has the following functions that are integral in man-
aging this message box. Note that over the years, we expect a wide variety of mess-
aging languages to be developed (examples of such messaging languages include
KQML [33] at a high level, and remote procedure calls at a much lower level). In or-
der to provide maximal flexibility, we only specify below the core interface functions
available on the Msgbox type. Note that this set of functions may be augmented by
the addition of other functions on an agent by agent basis.
• sendMessagehsource agenti; hdest genti; hmessagei: This causes a quintuple ı=o;
‘‘src’’, ‘‘dest’’, ‘‘message’’, ‘‘time’’) to be placed in Msgbox. The parameter o signi-
fies an outgoing message. When a call of the form
sendMessage‘‘src’’; ‘‘dest’’; ‘‘message’’
is executed, the state of Msgbox changes by the insertion of the above quintuple de-
noting the sending of a message from the source agent src to a given Destination
agent dest involving the message body ‘‘message’’.
• getMessagehsrci: This causes a collection of quintuples
i; ‘‘src’’; ‘‘agent’’; ‘‘msg’’; ‘‘time’’
to be read from Msgbox. The i signifies an incoming message. Note that all messages
from the given source to the agent agent whose message box is being examined, are
returned by this operation. ‘‘time’’ denotes the time at which the message was re-
ceived.
• timedGetMessagehopi; hvalidi: This causes the collection of all quintuples tup of
the form tup def i; hsrci; hagenti; hmessagei; time to be read from Msgbox, such
that the comparison tup:time op valid is true, where op is required to be any of
the standard comparison operators <, >, 6 , P , or .
• getVarhmssgIdi; hvarNamei: This functions searches through all the triples in the
‘‘message’’ to find the requested variable. First, it converts the variable from the
string format given by the ‘‘value’’ into its corresponding data type which is given
by ‘‘varType’’. If the requested variable is not in the message determined by the
‘‘MssgId’’, then an error string is returned.
Agents interact with the external world through the msgbox code – in particular,
external agents may update agent a’s msgbox, thus introducing new objects to agent
a’s state, and triggering state changes which are not triggered by agent a.
Definition 11 (Action base AB). An action base, AB, is any finite collection of
actions.
In Refs. [21,19], three alternative definitions of concurrent execution of actions are
given. For one of those definitions, determining concurrent executability is polyno-
mial time, for another it is NP-complete, and for the third, it is co-NP-complete.
These complexities reflect definitions that are increasingly epistemically satisfying.
Rather than reinvent the wheel here, we will merely assume the existence of a pred-
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icate, conc ex which takes four arguments – a set of ground action atoms, a precon-
dition, an add-list, and a delete list. Intuitively, conc exAset; Pre; Add; Del means
that the set, Aset of actions is concurrently executable and the concurrent execution
of the actions in Aset may be viewed as a single ‘‘composite’’ action with the spec-
ified precondition, Prea, Adda and Dela. In the event that the Aset is not con-
currently executable, Prea is set to the special condition false, reflecting the fact that
the ‘‘composite’’ action is un-executable.
3.3.2. Action constraints AC
An action constraint AC is an explicit statement saying that a given set of actions
is not concurrently executable if certain conditions are met.
Definition 12 (Action constraints AC). An action constraint AC has the syntactic
form:
a1~X1; . . . ; ak~Xk
n o
 - v; 1
where a1~X1; . . . ; ak~Xk are action names, and v is a code call condition.
A set of action constraints is denoted by AC.
The above constraint says that if condition v is true, then the actions a1~X1,. . .,
ak~Xk are not concurrently executable.
Example 13 (Constraints for fly and attack). Here are two simple constraints for the
Fly and the Attack predicate:
ffly plane1X1; Y1; A1; S1; fly plane2X2; Y2; A2; S2g - Y1  Y2
fattackPg - inP; heli1 : getPos 
The first says that plane1 and plane2 shall never fly to the same destination. The sec-
ond says that heli1 shall never be attacked (this makes sense if the plane for which
this constraint is valid knows that heli1 is a friendly helicopter).
3.3.3. Agent programs
In this section, we introduce the important concept of an agent program. Intu-
itively, agent programs specify what an agent is obliged to do, what an agent is per-
mitted to do, and what an agent is forbidden from doing. Agent programs provide a
mechanism to encode the intended behavior of an agent.
Definition 14 (Action status atom). Suppose a~t is an action atom, where~t is a vec-
tor of terms (variables or objects) matching the type schema of a. Then, the formulas
Pa~t, Fa~t, Oa~t, Wa~t, and Do a~t are action status atoms. The set
fP;F;O; W;Dog is called the action status set.
We will often abuse notation and omit parentheses in action status atoms, writing
Pa~t instead of Pa~t, and so on. An action status atom has the following intuitive
meaning (a more detailed description of the precise reading of these atoms will be
provided later in Section 5.2):
• Pa means that the agent is permitted to take action a;
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• Fa means that the agent is forbidden from taking a;
• Oa means that the agent is obliged to take action a;
• Wa means that obligation to take action a is waived; and,
• Doa means that the agent does take action a.
Notice that the operators P;F;O; and W have been extensively studied in the area
of deontic logic [39,3]. Moreover, the operator Do is in the spirit of the ‘‘praxiolog-
ical’’ operator EaA [30], which informally means that ‘‘agent a sees to it that A is the
case’’ [39, p. 292].
Definition 15 (Action program P). An action rule (rule, for short) is a clause r of the
form
A L1; . . . ; Ln; 2
where A is an action status atom, and each of L1; . . . ; Ln is either an action status at-
om, or a code call atom, each of which may be preceded by a negation sign (:).
An agent program P is a finite collection of rules. An agent program P is positive
if all its rules are positive.
We require that every root variable which occurs in the head, A, of a rule r and
every root or path variable occurring in a negative atom also occurs in some positive
atom in the body (this is the well-known allowedness requirement on rules [35]).
4. Belief language and data structures
In this section, we introduce the important notion of a belief atom. Belief atoms
express the beliefs of one agent a about what holds in another agent’s, say b’s, state.
They will be used later in Definition 28 to define the notion of a meta agent program,
which is central to this paper. When an agent a reasons about another agent b, it
must have some beliefs about b’s underlying action base (what actions can b take?),
b ’s agent program (how will b reason?) etc. These beliefs will be discussed later in
more depth.
In this section, we describe the belief language that is used by IMPACT agents. In
particular, our definitions proceed as follows:
(1) We first describe in Section 4.1 a hierarchy of belief languages of increasing
complexity as we go ‘‘up’’ the hierarchy. The designer of an agent choses an ap-
propriate language from this hierarchy for her agent.
(2) We then define in Section 4.2 an intermediate structure called a basic belief ta-
ble. Intuitively, a basic belief table maintained by agent a contains information
about the beliefs a has about the states of other agents, as well as a itself. It also
includes a’s belief about action status atoms that are adopted by other agents.
(3) Each agent also has some beliefs about how other agents reason about beliefs.
As the same syntactic language fragment can admit many dierent semantics, the
agent maintains a Belief Semantics Table, describing its perceptions of the seman-
tics used by other agents to reason about beliefs (Section 4.3).
(4) We then extend (in Section 4.4) the concept of a basic belief table to a belief
table. Intuitively, a belief table is obtained by adding an extra column to the basic
belief table – the reason for separating these two definitions is that the new column
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may refer to conditions on the columns of basic belief tables. Intuitively, belief
tables contain statements of the form If condition / is true, then agent a believes
w where w is a condition about some agent b’s state, or about the actions that
agent b might take.
It is important to note that assuming additional datatypes as part of our under-
lying software package has strong implications on the possible code calls as intro-
duced in Definition 3: the more datatypes we have, the more types of code calls
can be formulated in our language. We will introduce in Definition 35 a precise
notion of the set of extended code calls.
4.1. Belief language hierarchy
We are now ready to define the beliefs that agent a may hold about the code calls
agent b can perform. These code calls determine the code call conditions that may or
may not hold in agent b’s state. Let
Bab; v
represent a belief of agent a about what holds in the state of agent b. In this case,
agent a must have beliefs about agent b ’s software package Sb: the code call con-
dition v must be in Sb. We will collect all the beliefs that an agent a has about an-
other agent b in a set Cab (see Definition 34).
From now on we refer to code call conditions satisfying the latter property (i.e., ‘‘v
has to be contained in Sb’’) as compatible code call conditions. We will use the same
term for action atoms: compatible action atoms of agent a with respect to agent b, are
those action atoms in the action base that a believes agent b holds. We also assume
that the structure of such an action contained in b’s base (as believed by a) is defined
in Cab. This means that the schema, the set of preconditions, the add-list and the
delete-list are uniquely determined: we simply assume they are already given.
Definition 16 (Belief atom/literal, BAt1a; b, BLit1a;A). Let a; b be agents in A.
Then we define the set BAt1a; b of a-belief atoms about b of level 1 as follows:
(1) If v is a compatible code call condition of a with respect to b, then Bab; v is a
belief atom.
(2) For Op 2 fO;W;P;F;Dog: if a~t is a compatible action atom of agent a with
respect to b, then Bab;Opa~t is a belief atom.
If Bab; v is a belief atom, then Bab; v and :Bab; v are called belief literals of
level 1, the corresponding set is denoted by BLit1a; b.
Let
BAt1a;A def
[
b2A
BAt1a; b and BLit1a;A def
[
b2A
BLit1a; b
be the set of all a-belief atoms (respectively, belief literals) relative to A. This reflects
the idea that agent a can have beliefs about many agents in A, not just about a sin-
gle one.
Here are a couple of belief atoms from our RAMP example.
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Example 17 (Belief atoms in RAMP).
• Bheli1tank1; inpos1; tank1 : getPos This belief atom says that the agent,
heli1 believes that agent tank1’s current state indicates that tank1’s current po-
sition is pos1.
• Bheli1tank1;Fattackpos1; pos2This belief atom says that the agent, heli1 be-
lieves that agent tank1’s current state indicates that it is forbidden for tank1 to
attack from pos1 to pos2.
• Bheli3 tank1;Odrivepos1; pos2; 35This belief atom says that the agent, heli3
believes that agent tank1’s current state makes it obligatory for tank1 to drive
from location pos1 to pos2 at 35 miles per hour.
It is important to note that these are beliefs held by agents heli1 and heli3, respec-
tively. Any of them could be an incorrect belief.
Thus far, we have not allowed for nested beliefs. The language BLit1a;A does
not allow agent a to have beliefs of the form ‘‘Agent b believes that agent c’ s state
contains code call condition v’’, i.e., agent a cannot express beliefs it has about the
beliefs of another agent.
The definition below introduces nested beliefs and also a general belief language.
We introduce the following notation: for a given set X of formulae we denote by
Conj: X  the set of all conjunctions consisting of elements of X or their negations:
x1 ^ :x2 ^    ^ xn, where xi 2 X . We emphasize that this does not correspond to
the usual closure of X under & and :: in particular, it does not allow us to formulate
disjunctions, if X consists of atoms.
Definition 18 (Nested beliefs BLitia; b, Belief language BLai ). In the following let
a; b 2A. We want to define BLai , the belief language of agent a of level i. This is
done recursively as follows:
i6 1: In accordance with Definition 16 (where we already defined BAt1a; b) we
denote by BAt0a; b as well as by BLit0a; b
f/ j / is a compatible code call condition or action atomg
the flat set of code call conditions or action atoms – no belief atoms are allowed. Fur-
thermore, we define
BL0a; b def BAt0a; b
BL1a; b def Conj: BAt1a; b ;
i.e., the set of formulae BAt0a; b, respectively, of all conjunctions of belief literals
from BAt1a; b.
We call
BLa0 def
S
b2A BL0a; b
BLa1 def Conj:
S
b2ABL1a; b
ÿ 
the belief languages of agent a of level 0, respectively, of level 1.
i > 1: To define nested belief literals we set for i > 1
BAtia; b def fBab; bjb 2 BAtiÿ1b;Ag;
BLitia; b def f:Bab; bjb 2 BAtiÿ1b;Ag:
This finishes the recursive definition of BLitia; b.
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The definition of the belief language of agent a of level i can now be given directly:
BLai def Conj:
[
b2A
BLia; b
 !
3
where
BLia; b def Conj: BAtia; b :
Finally we define the maximal belief language an agent a can have:
BLa1 def Conj:
[1
i0
BLai
 !
: 4
Formulae in this language are also called general belief formulae.
We will later also use the following definitions:
(1) BAtia;A def
S
b2ABAtia; b is called the set of belief atoms of depth i.
(2) BLitia;A def
S
b2ABLitia; b is called the set of belief literals of depth i.
(3) We define
BAt1a;A def
[1
i0
BAtia;A; BLit1a;A def
[1
i0
BLitia;A:
At first sight the above definition looks overly complicated. The reason is that ev-
ery agent keeps track of only its own beliefs, not those of other agents (we will see
later in Lemma 24 that an agent may be able to simulate another agent’s state). This
means that a nested belief atom of the form Bab;Bcd; v does not make sense
(because b 6 c) and is not allowed in the above definition.
Note also that the closure under f&;:g in Equation (3) allows us to use conjunc-
tions with respect to dierent agents Bab; v ^Bac; v0. The closure in Equation
(4) allows us to also use dierent nested levels of beliefs, like Bab; v^
Bac;Bcd; v0. However, for most practical applications this additional freedom
is not necessary. We discuss this point again in Lemma 24.
Here are some belief formulae from the RAMP example (see Section 2 or Appen-
dix B).
Example 19 (Belief formulae for RAMP). The following are belief formulae from
BLheli11 , BL
tank1
2 and BL
coord
3 .
• Bheli1tank1; inpos1; tank1 : getPos . This formula is in BLheli11 . It says that
agent heli1 believes that agent tank1’s current state indicates that tank1’s current
position is pos1.
• Btank1heli1;Bheli1tank1; inpos1; tank1 : getPos . This formula is in
BLtank12 . It says that agent tank1 believes that agent heli1 believes that agent
tank1’s current position is pos1.
• Bcoordtank1;Btank1heli1;Bheli1tank2; inpos2; tank2 : getPos . This for-
mula is in BLcoord3 . It says that agent coord believes that agent tank1 believes
that heli1 believes that agent tank2’s current position is pos2.
However, the following formula does not belong to any of the above belief lan-
guages:
Btank1heli1;Btank1tank1; inpos1; tank : getPos :
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The reason for this is because in heli1’s state there can be no beliefs belonging to
tank1.
4.2. Basic belief table
We now describe how the agent keeps track of its beliefs about other agents and
how these beliefs can be updated. The easiest way to structure a set of beliefs is to
view it as a relational database structure. The notion of a basic belief table provides
the starting point for defining how an agent maintains beliefs about other agents.
Definition 20 (Basic belief table BBTa). Every agent a has an associated basic belief
table BBTa which is a set of pairs
hh;/i;
where h 2A and / 2 BLhi , i 2 N.
For example, if the entry hb;Bba; vi is in the table BBTa, then this intuitively
means that agent a believes that agent b has the code call condition v among its
own beliefs about agent a. Here / 2 BLb1.
Example 21 (Basic belief table for RAMP agents). We define suitable basic belief
tables for agent tank1 (Table 1) and heli1 (Table 2).
These tables indicate that tank1 and heli1 work closely together and know their
positions. Both believe that the other knows about both positions. tank1 also be-
lieves that tank2 believes that in heli2’s state, tank1 is in position pos3 (which is
actually wrong).
heli1 thinks that tank2 believes that tank1 believes that heli1 is in position pos4,
which is also wrong.
What kind of operations should we support on belief tables? We distinguish be-
tween two dierent types:
1. For a given agent h, other than a, we may want to select all entries in the table
having h as first argument.
2. For a given belief formula /, we may be interested in all those entries, whose sec-
ond argument ‘‘implies’’ (wrt. some underlying definition of entailment) the given
formula /.
The latter point motivates us to consider more general relations between belief
formulae with respect to an epistemic background theory. This will extend the ex-
pressiveness and utility of our overall framework. For example the background the-
ory may contain some epistemic axioms about beliefs, some inference rules and the
Table 1
A basic belief table for agent tank1
Agent Formula
heli1 inpos1; heli1 : getPos 
heli2 Bheli2tank1; inpos1; tank1 : getPos 
tank2 Btank2heli1;Bheli1tank1; inpos3; tank1 : getPos 
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relation between belief formulae could be an entailment relation with respect to the
chosen background theory (see also [9,10]).
4.3. Belief semantics table
Agent a may associate dierent background theories with dierent agents: it may
assume that agent h reasons according to semantics BSemah and assumes that agent
h0 adopts a stronger semantics BSema
h0 . We will store the information in a separate
relational data structure:
Definition 22 (Belief semantics table BSemTa of agent a). Every agent a has an as-
sociated belief semantics table BSemTa which is a set of pairs
hh;BSemah i;
where h 2A, BSemah is a belief semantics over BLhi and i 2 N is fixed. In addition
we require at most one entry per agent h. Hence, BSemah determines an entailment
relation
/ BSema
h
w
between belief formulae /;w 2 BLhi . We also assume the existence of the following
function (which constitutes an extended code call, see Definition 35) over BSemTa:
BSemTa : selectagent;; h;
which selects all entries corresponding to a specific agent h 2A.
Example 23 (Belief semantics tables for RAMP agents). We briefly describe what
suitable Belief Semantics Table for heli1 and tank1 may look like. We have to define
entailment relations BSemtank1tank2, BSem
tank1
heli1 , BSem
tank1
heli2 , and BSem
heli1
tank1, BSem
heli1
tank2,
BSemheli1heli2. For simplicity we restrict these entailment relations to belief formulae
of level at most 1, i.e., BLh1.
(1) BSemheli1tank1: The smallest entailment relation satisfying the schema
Btank1tank1:1; v ! v:
This says that heli1 believes that all beliefs of tank1 about tank1:1 are actually true:
tank1 knows all about tank1:1.
(2) BSemheli1tank2: The smallest entailment relation satisfying the schema
Btank2tank2:1; v ! v:
This says that heli1 believes that all beliefs of tank2 about tank2:1 are actually true:
tank2 knows all about tank2:1.
Table 2
A basic belief table for agent heli1
Agent Formula
heli2 inpos2; heli2: getPos 
tank1 inpos1; tank1: getPos 
tank1 Btank1heli1; inpos1; heli1: getPos 
tank2 Btank2tank1;Btank1heli1; inpos4; heli1: getPos 
J. Dix et al. / J. Logic Programming 46 (2000) 1–60 19
(3) BSemtank1heli1 : The smallest entailment relation satisfying the schema
Bheli1tank1; v ! v:
This says that tank1 believes that if heli1 believes in v for tank1, then this is
true (heli1 knows all about tank1. A particular interesting instance of v is
inpos1; tank1 : getPos .
(4) BSemtank1heli2 : The smallest entailment relation satisfying the schema
Bheli2tank2; v ^Bheli2tank2:1; v ! v:
This says that tank1 believes that if heli2 believes that v is true both for tank2 and
tank2:1 then this is actually true.
The notion of a semantics used in the belief semantics table is very general: it can
be an arbitrary relation on BLhi BLhi . We briefly illustrate (1) which sort of se-
mantics can be expressed and (2) how our framework can be suitably restricted for
practical applications.
The following two simple axioms that can be built into a semantics show the gen-
erality and flexibility of our framework:
1 Bh2h; v ) Bh2h0; v
2 Bh2h; v ) v
The first axiom refers to dierent agents h; h0 while the second combines dierent lev-
els of belief atoms: see Eqs. (3) and (4) and the discussion after Definition 18. In
many applications, however, such axioms will not occur: h  h0 is fixed and the
axioms operate on the same level i of belief formulae.
Thus it makes sense to consider simplified versions of semantics that are easy to
implement and to handle. In fact, given the results of [21,19] and the various seman-
tics Sem for agent programs (i.e., with no belief atoms), we now show how such a
semantics Sem naturally induces a semantics BSemah for use in a belief semantics ta-
ble. These semantics can be implemented and handled as built-ins. Entries in
BSemTa then have the form
hh1; Semfeasi
hh2; Semrati
hh3; Semreasi
meaning that agent a believes that the agents hi behave according to the indicated
semantics – such semantics are well understood for agent programs without beliefs.
The idea is to use the semantics Sem of the agent program Pab (that a believes b
to have) for the evaluation of the belief formulae. However, this is complicated by
the fact that the computation of the semantics depends on various other parameters
like the state and the action and integrity constraints.
Before stating the definition, we recall that a semantics Sem is a set of action sta-
tus sets which depends on (1) an agent program, (2) a set of action constraints, (3) a
set of integrity constraints, and, finally, (4) the current state. The notation SemhP
only reflects the influence of (1) but (2)–(4) are equally important. For example,
when the belief table contains the entry hh1; vi where v is a code call condition, v
is a belief of a about h1’s state. v is therefore a condition on the state of h1. In
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contrast, an entry hh1;Opa~ti is a belief of a about the actions of h1 holds. Conse-
quently action atoms can be seen as conditions on h1’s agent program.
We show below how to define belief semantics on belief languages of levels 0 and
1. Recall that belief formulae contain both code call conditions and action atoms
which arw evaluated over dierent domains. Therefore for a formula / which is a
conjunction of code call conditions (ccc’s for short) and action atoms, we let
CCC/ be the conjunction of all ccc0s occuring in /;
ACT/ be the conjunction of all action atoms occuring in /:
The remark below specifies a methodology for incorporating agent semantics into our
framework.
Remark 24 (Sem for agent programs induces BSemah ). Let Sem be the reasonable, ra-
tional or feasible semantics for agent programs (i.e. , not containing beliefs). Suppose
agent a believes that agent h reasons according to Sem. Let Ph be the agent pro-
gram of h and Oh, ACh and ICh the state, action constraints and integrity
constraints of h. Then there is a basic belief table BSemTa and a belief semantics
BSemah induced by Sem such that
• a believes in h’s state, and
• a believes in all actions taken by h with respect to Sem and Ph.
More generally: let i 2 N and suppose agent a believes that agent h1 believes that
agent h2 believes that . . . believes that agent hiÿ1 acts according to P
ar (where
r def h1; h2; . . . ; hiÿ1) and state Or:1 Then there is a basic belief table BSemTa
and a belief semantics BSemar induced by Sem on a suitably restricted subset of
BLh1 BLh1 such that
• a believes in hiÿ1’s state, and
• a believes in all actions taken by hiÿ1 with respect to Sem and Pr.
The reason that the above statement is not amenable to a proof or disproof is the
part ‘‘. . . agent a believes that agent h reasons according to Sem’’. It is intuitely clear
what this means, but the precise meaning is given by argument below.
Justification of remark. We define a belief semantics BSemah on BL
h
1 BLh1 with
respect to a state O, AC, and IC as follows:
/ BSema
h
w by
1: ACTw 2 SemhPah [ fACT/g wrt: O [ CCC/:
2: O [ CCC/  CCCw:
3: AC are satisfied wrt: enlarged program Pah [ fACT/g:
4: O [ CCC/  IC
8>><>>>:
We now define a belief semantics BSemah on BL
h
1 BLh1 with respect to a state O,
AC, and IC as follows.
(1) We restrict, as already discussed, to entailment relations that operate on the
same level of beliefs. For level 0 we just defined such a relation.
1 See Definitions 34 and 31 for a detailed introduction of these concepts.
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(2) For level 1 beliefs we also restrict to those that contain the same agent as first
component: fBhc;/ j / is a code call condition or an action atomg.
(3) For a belief formula / of level 1 which has the form Bhc;/1 ^    ^Bhc;/n
we let
CCC/ def CCC/1 ^    ^ CCC/n
and
ACT/ def ACT/1 ^    ^ACT/n:
(4) We define:
/ BSema
h
w by
1: ACTw 2 SemcPah; c [ fACT/g
wrt: O [ CCC/:
2: O [ CCC/  CCCw:
3: AC are satisfied wrt: Pah; c [ fACT/g:
4: O [ CCC/  IC
8>>><>>>:
The notation Pah; c denotes the program that a believes h to believe about c. The
sequences r will be introduced in Definition 31.
4.4. Belief tables
We are now ready to give the full definition of a belief table.
Definition 25 (Belief table BTa). Every agent a has an associated belief table BTa,
which consists of triples
hh;/; vBi;
where h 2A, / 2 BLhi and vB 2 BCondah is a belief condition of a to be defined
below (see Definition 26).
The projection of BTa on the first two entries coincides with the basic belief table
introduced in Definition 20. Thus, every belief table induces a (possibly empty) basic
belief table.
We also assume the existence of the following two functions over BTa:
BTa : proj-selectagent;; h
which selects all entries of BTa of the form hh;/; truei (i.e., corresponding to a spe-
cific agent h 2A and having the third entry empty) and projects them on the first
two arguments, and
BTa : B-proj-selectr; h;/
for all r 2 R def f);(; () g and for all belief formulae / 2 BLh1. This function
selects all entries of BTa of the form hh;w; truei that contain a belief formula w which
is in relation r to / with respect to the semantics BSemah as specified in the belief
semantics table BSemTa and projects them on the first two arguments.
For example, if we choose )2 R as the relation r then
w) / 2 BSemah
or, equivalently, BSema
h
w) / says / is entailed by w relative to semantics BSemah .
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The reader may well ask about whether belief update functions should also be in-
cluded. In fact, belief updating is an action that may be included in an agent, should
the agent developer deem it necessary for his agent. Such an action can be imple-
mented using any standard belief updating algorithm proposed in the literature.
We emphasize the fact that although the two introduced project-select functions
are defined on the full belief table BTa, they can be thought of as operating on
the induced basic belief table BBTa, which results from BTa by projection on the first
two arguments of those triples where the third entry is empty.
Why do we require that BTa : proj-selectagent;; h selects only those triples
where the third entry set to true? The reason is that when we evaluate the belief con-
dition (to ensure compatibility in Definition 25) we do this recursively and thus end
up with triples having the third entry true. As we could, of course, have added an-
other argument to the function which allows us to specify the third entry.
In the preceding definition we introduced the notion of a belief table but we have
not specified its third entry, namely the belief condition. Intuitively, hb;/; vBi means
that
Agent a believes that / is true in agent b0s state; if the condition vB holds:
Note that agent a can only reason about its own state which contains (through the
belief table BTa and the belief semantics table BSemTa) his beliefs as well as his
underlying epistemic theory about other agent’s states.
BTa and BSemTa, taken together, simulate agent b’s state as believed by agent a.
Note 1. There is considerable work on modal multiagent logics where agent a has
beliefs about agent b and so on. In general, in such logics, each agent has an asso-
ciated belief theory about another agent. This is consistent with our view. Given
an agent b, agent a’s base-beliefs about b consists of the set of all formulas / such
that there is a row r in BTa with r:Agent  b and r:Condition  true and
r:Formula  /. Agent a’s total set of beliefs about agent b is the set of all formulas
derivable from its base beliefs using the semantics that agent a believes agent b is
using – which is contained in BSemTa.
A belief condition vB that occurs in an entry hb;/; vBimust therefore be evaluated
in what agent a believes is agent b’s state. This is important because the code call
conditions must be compatible and therefore not only depend on agent a but also
on agent b.
Definition 26 (Belief conditions BCondah). The set BCondah of belief conditions
of agent a is defined inductively as follows:
(1) Every code call condition v of agent a compatible with agent h is in
BCondah.
(2) If X is an entry in the basic belief table (or, equivalently the projection of an
entry of the belief table BTa on the first two arguments) or a variable over basic
belief table tuples, then
inX; BTa : proj-selectagent;; h
is in BCondah.
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(3) If X is an entry in the basic belief table or a variable over such entries, r 2 R,
/ 2 BLai and h 2A then
inX; BTa : B-proj-selectr; h;/
is in BCondah.
(4) If v is in BCondah, then so is :v.
(5) If v is in BCondah, then so is 9Xv.
(6) If v and v0 are in BCondah, then so is v&v0.
As belief conditions corresponding to step (1) above will be checked in what agent
a believes agent b’s state to be, we introduce the following notation:
• h partv def the subconjunction of v consisting of all code call conditions
not involving BTa,
• a parta; v def the subconjunction of v consisting of all code call conditions
that involve BTa.
Note that h partv consists of conditions that have to be checked in what a be-
lieves agent h’s state is, while a partv refers to the belief tables of agent a. Simi-
larly, for other agent b, c, d we have the notion of b partv, c partv and
d partv.
Example 27 (Belief table for RAMP agents revisited). We now consider Table 3 and
extend our basic belief tables for agent tank1 (Table 1) and heli1 (Table 2). Let
Bcondtank11 be the code call atom inpos1; tank1 : getPos  and define Bcondtank12 by
inhheli1; belief atomi; BTa : proj-selectagent;; heli1;
where
belief atom def Bheli1tank1; inpos3; tank1 : getPos :
The first row in the table says that tank1 unconditionally believes that in heli1’s
state, the position for heli1 is pos1.
The second row in the belief table above, says that tank1 believes that if tank1’s
position is pos1, heli2 believes that in tank1’s state the position of tank1 is pos1.
The third row in the belief table says that if tank1 believes heli1 believes that
tank1’s position is pos3, then tank2 believes heli1 believes tank1’s position is pos3.
The table for heli1 is as shown in Table 4, where Bcondheli11 stands for
inpos2; heli2 : getPos 
and Bcondtank12 is defined by
inhtank1; belief atomi; BTa : proj-selectagent;; tank1;
where
belief atom def Btank1heli1; inpos4; heli1 : getPos :
Table 3
A belief table for agent tank1
Agent Formula Condition
heli1 inpos1; heli1 : getPos  true
heli2 Bheli2tank1; inpos1; tank1 : getPos  Bcondtank11
tank2 Btank2heli1;Bheli1tank1; inpos3; tank1 : getPos  Bcondtank12
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We are now in a position to formally define a meta agent program, i.e., a program
which formalizes the actions and the circumstances under which an agent a will ex-
ecute these actions based not only on its own state but also on its beliefs about other
agent’s states, and actions those other agents might take.
Definition 28 (Meta agent program (map) BP). A meta agent rule (mar for short) for
agent a is an expression r of the form
A L1; . . . ; Ln; 5
where A is an action status atom, and each of L1; . . . ; Ln is either a code call literal, an
action literal or a belief literal from BLit1a;A.
A meta agent program, (map for short), for agent a is a finite setBP of meta agent
rules for a.
Note that belief atoms are not allowed in the head of rules. Thus a meta agent
program does not define beliefs: it only uses them to derive action status atoms. Be-
liefs are solely defined by the belief data structures (belief table and through the belief
semantics table).
Example 29 (map’s for RAMP agents). Let heli1’s meta agent program be as fol-
lows:
PattackP1; P2  Bheli1tank1; inP2; tank1 : getPos ;
PflyP1; P3; A; S;
PattackP3; P2
where attackP1; P2 is an action which means attack position P2 from position P1.
heli1’s program says heli1 can attack position P2 from P1 if heli1 believes tank1 is
in position P2, heli1 can fly from P1 to another position P3 at altitude A and speed S,
and heli1 can attack position P2 from P3.
Let tank1’s meta agent program be as follows:
OattackP1; P2  OdriveRouteP0; P1; P2; P3; S;
Btank1tank2; inP2; tank2 : getPos :
If tank1 must drive through a point where it believes tank2 is, it must attack tank2.
From now on we assume that the software package SaTaS;FaS of each agent a
contains as distinguished data types
(1) the belief table BTa, and
(2) the belief semantics table BSemTa,
Table 4
A belief table for agent heli1
Agent Formula Condition
heli2 inpos2; heli2 : getPos  true
tank1 inpos1; tank1 : getPos  true
tank1 Btank1heli1; inpos1; heli1 : getPos  Bcondheli11
tank2 Btank2tank1;Btank1heli1; inpos4; heli1 : getPos  Bcondheli12
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as well as the corresponding functions
BTa : B-proj-selectr; h;/ and BSemTa : selectagent;; h:
Before concluding this section, we briefly discuss the possibility of beliefs being
incomplete. Agent a represents its beliefs about another agent b via its associated be-
lief table and belief semantics table. However, it is entirely possible that one or both
of these tables in incomplete, incorrect, or both. At a fixed instant of time t all agents
(including human beings!) can only reason about agent b based on their beliefs about
b and their background knowledge (i.e., their state). Agent a may or may not (de-
pending upon the application) need to complete its beliefs about agent b. In the case
of the RAMP example, a friendly vehicle agent a can only guess what an enemy agent
b will do. Such guesses are likely to be wrong (as is the case with all guesses). How-
ever, agent a’s associated map may trigger actions to be taken that reduce the igno-
rance about agent b. For example, it could send a message (which is an action!) to
another battlefield analysis agent, requesting a list of all possible scenarios describing
the intentions of this action, together with plausibility rankings of the scenarios, as
well as the dangers and opportunities posed by each scenario. It can then make its
decisions based on that. Another action it could possibly take is to bomb part of
the route of enemy vehicle b to remove uncertainty. For example, if agent b us mov-
ing north on a road that forks to the left towards friendly asset A1 and forks to the
right towards friendly asset A2, by destroying or mining the fork to A2, it can eec-
tively reduce uncertainty about the intent of agent b – in this case, even though it still
doesn’t know what agent b’s intentions are, it can turn the situation to its advantage.
All these types of reasoning can be encoded as rules within the map paradigm.
We did not, however, incorporate a Kripke-style semantics as a built-in feature
of our framework (as described in Ref. [25]). Such semantics can be plugged in, if
needed, but the designer of the agent has the freedom (or the burden) to do so. Note
that we are describing a framework suitable for arbitrary software agents, not for a
particular knowledge and belief agent.
5. Meta agent programs: semantics
It remains to define the semantics of meta agent programs. As in the case of agent
programs without any metaknowledge (summarized briefly in the appendix), the ba-
sic notion upon which more sophisticated semantics will be based is the notion of a
feasible status set for a given meta agent program BP. In order to do this we first
have to introduce the notion of a belief status set, the counterpart of a status set
for a meta agent program.
Definition 30 (Belief status set BS). A belief status set BS of agent a, also written
BSa, is a set consisting of two kinds of elements:
• ground action status atoms over Sa and
• belief literals from BAt1a;A of level greater or equal to 1.
The reason that we do not allow belief atoms of level 0 is to avoid having code call
conditions in our set. Such conditions are not implied by the underlying map (only
action status atoms are allowed in the heads of rules). Moreover, in the agent
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programs without beliefs (which we want to extend) they are not allowed as well (see
Definition 60).
We emphasize the dierent treatment of status atoms and belief literals. A belief
status set is considered to be
• complete with respect to action status atoms, i.e. the absence of a particular status
atom means its negation is true,
• incomplete with respect to belief literals, i.e. the absence of Bab; v does not mean
that we assume :Bab; v.
Thus while negation signs in front of belief atoms are not handled as negation-as-
failure (they are completely determined by the belief – and the belief – semantics ta-
ble) the negation in front of status atoms is given a nonmonotonic interpretation.
The handling of incomplete beliefs through the belief tables may also lead to in-
consistencies: if the belief table contains both Bab; v and :Bab; v, any associated
belief status set BSwill also contain those literals. Together with the belief semantics
compatibility condition (see Definition 46) this will result in a belief status set con-
taining the whole language of belief literals. This can only be avoided by imposing
that the belief table and the belief semantics table are consistent. To ensure this, how-
ever, is the responsibility of the agent designer.
To determine whether a belief status set is feasible, we must examine its compli-
ance with
(1) the map BP of agent a,
(2) the current state O of a,
(3) the underlying set of action and integrity constraints of a.
In contrast to agent programs without beliefs we now have to cope with all agents
about which a holds beliefs. Even if the map BP does not contain nested beliefs
(which are allowed), the belief table BTa may and, by the belief semantics table
BSemTa, such nested beliefs may imply (trigger) other beliefs. Thus we cannot re-
strict ourselves to belief atoms of level 1.
A belief status set BS of agent a naturally induces, for any agent b 2A, two pa-
rameters: the state and the various action status sets that agent a believes other
agents b to hold or those that a believes other agents b to hold about other agents
c. To easily formalize the latter conditions, we introduce the notion of a sequence:
Definition 31 (Sequence r; q of agents). A sequence r of agents from A is defined
inductively as follows:
(1) The empty sequence  is a sequence.
(2) If a 2A and q is a sequence, then a, a; q, q;a are sequences.
We use both r and q to refer to an arbitrary sequence.
The overall intuition of the formula Bab;Bbc;Bcd; v is that if we keep
agent a in mind, then agent a believes in a code call condition of type b; c;d,
i.e., a ccc that b believes that c believes that it holds in d’s state.
We also say sometimes ‘‘r’s state’’ and refer to the code call conditions that are
true in what a believes that b believes . . . where a; b; . . .  r.
Definition 32 (Induced status set Pactionb BS and state Pstateb BS). Let a; b be agents
and BP a map used by agent a. Every belief status set BS of agent a induces the
following two sets describing a’s beliefs about b’s actions and b’s state
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Pactionb BS def fOpa~t j Bab;Opa~t 2 BS; where Op 2 fO;W;P;F;Dogg
Pstateb BS def fv j Bab; v 2 BS and v is a code call conditiong
Now assume that agent a believes in BS. Then Pstateb BS formalizes the state of
agent b as believed by agent a. Similarly, Pactionb BS represents the action status
set of agent b as believed by agent a.
Analogousansy, for any sequence r, BS induces the following two sets:
Pactionr BS describing a’s belief about actions corresponding to r
Pstater BS describing a’s belief about the state corresponding to r;
depending on the depth of the belief atoms occuring in BP.
The formal definition of Pactionr BSand Pstater BSis by induction on the structure
of r. As it should be clear, we avoid this technical definition. Instead we shortly
illustrate the case for r  b; c. Then
Pactionb;c BS def fOpa~t j Bab;Bbc;Opa~t 2 BSg
Pstateb;c BS def fv jBab;Bbc; v 2 BS g:
It is important to note that for any sequence, r of agents, Pactionr BS is a set of ac-
tion status atoms. Likewise, Pstater BS is a set of code call conditions that do not in-
volve beliefs. For the empty sequence , Paction BS (respectively, Pstate BS) denotes
a’s own action status set (respectively, a’s own state) as defined by the subset of BS
not involving belief atoms.
Example 33 (Belief status sets for RAMP agents). Consider the map of heli1 given in
Example 29
BSheli1 def fPflypointA; pointB; 10000; 200;OflypointA; pointB; 10000; 200;
Bheli1heli2;PflyPointA; PointB; 10000; 200;
Bheli1heli2; inpos; heli2 : getPos;
Bheli1heli2;Bheli2tank1; inpos; tank1 : getPos 
Bheli1heli2;Bheli2tank1;PdrivepointX; pointY; 40g
This belief status set for heli1 says:
(1) It is possible to fly from pointA to pointB at an altitude of 10 000 feet and a
speed of 200 knots.
(2) It is obligatory to fly from pointA to pointB at an altitude of 10 000 feet and a
speed of 200 knots.
(3) heli1 believes that in heli2’s state it is possible to fly from pointA to pointB at
10 000 feet and 200 knots.
(4) heli1 believes that in heli2’s state the position of heli2 is pos.
(5) heli1 believes heli2 believes that tank1’s position is pos.
(6) heli1 believes heli2 believes that in tank1’s state it is possible to drive from
pointX to pointY at 40 miles per hour.
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We then have:
Pactionheli2 BSheli1  fPflypointA; pointB; 10000; 200g
Pstateheli2BSheli1  finpos; heli2 : getPos g
Pactionheli2;tank1BSheli1  fPdrivepointX; pointY; 40g
Pstateheli2;tank1BSheli1  finpos; tank1 : getPos g
These sets formalize the following:
• Pactionheli2 BSheli1 describes heli1’s beliefs about heli2’s actions and it says that it
is possible to fly from pointA to pointB at 10 000 feet and 200 knots.
• Pstateheli2BSheli1 describes heli1’s beliefs about heli2’s state and it says that its
position is pos.
• Pactionheli2;tank1BSheli1 describes heli1’s beliefs about heli2’s beliefs about
tank1’s actions, and it says that it is possible to drive from pointX to pointY at
40 miles per hour.
• Pstateheli2;tank1BSheli1 describes heli1’s beliefs about heli2’s beliefs about
tank1’s state, and it says that its position is pos.
Obviously for a to make a guess about agent b’s behaviour, agent a not only
needs a belief table and a belief semantics table, but also needs to guess b’s action
base, action program as well as the action and integrity constraints used by b. This
is like guessing b’s software package which we motivated and illustrated just before
Definition 16 (see the notion of compatible code call condition). We can easily ac-
complish this by adding an extra column to the belief table of each agent. This
new column is called ‘‘Item’’ and all values in this column are in the following set
of strings: fstate, ic, ac, progg. If, for instance, a’s belief table contains a quadruple
of the form b;/; v; ac, then this may be read as saying that agent a believes that /
is true in agent b’s action constraint if the condition v holds. Similar readings are
possible when the last column has the entry state, ic, etc. For notational convenience
and better readability we merge all these ingredients into a set Cab.
Definition 34 (Cab, Infoa). For agents a; b 2A, we denote by Cab the follow-
ing list of all beliefs that agent a holds about another agent b: the software package
Sab, the action base ABab, the agent program Pab, the integrity constraints
ICab and the action constraints ACab. Cab may also contain these objects
for sequences r  b; r1 (I.e. a sequence r whose head is b and whose tail is r1 in-
stead of b: we therefore also use the notation Cab; r1. Car represents a’s beliefs
about b’s beliefs about r1 (which itself may represent the beliefs of some agent c
about yet another agent, and so on).
In addition, given an agent a, we will often use the notation Infoa to denote the
software package Sa, the action base AB, the agent program P, the integrity con-
straints IC and action constraints AC used by agent a. Thus we define
Infoa def Ca.
Note that although not all of these functions will be referred to explicitly in the
rest of this paper, they are important. Often we do not explicitly mention the set
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of underlying action constraints, integrity constraints, action base or the software
package that agent a believes agent b to have (or that agent a believes wrt. a
sequence r), just for simplifying the notation.
The set Cab is very important and therefore we introduce the corresponding
software code calls, thereby extending our original package S.
Definition 35 (Extended code calls, Sext). Henceforth, given an agent a, we will dis-
tinguish (if it is not immediately clear from context) between basic and extended code
calls respectively code call conditions. The basic code calls refer to the package S,
while the latter refer to the extended software package which also contains
1. the following function of the belief table:
(a) a: belief table , which returns the full belief table of agent a, as a set of tri-
ples hh;/; vBi,
2. the following functions of the belief semantics table:
(b) a: belief sem table , which returns the full belief semantics table, as a set of
pairs hh;BSemah i,
(c) a: bel semanticsh;/;w, which returns true when / BSema
h
w and false
otherwise.
3. the following functions, which implement for every sequence r the beliefs of agent
a about r as described in Car:
(d) a: software packager, which returns the set Sar,
(e) a: action baser, which returns the set ABar,
(f) a: action programr, which returns the set Par,
(g) a: integrity constraintsr, which returns the set ICar
(h) a: action constraintsr, which returns the set ACar,
4. the following functions which simulate the state of another agent b or a sequence
r,
(i) a: bel ccc actr, which returns all the code call conditions and action status
atoms that a believes are true in r’s state. We write these objects in the form
‘‘in ; ’’ (respectively, ‘‘Opa’’ for action status atoms) in order to distinguish
them from those that have to be checked in a’s state.
(j) a: not bel ccc actr, which returns all the code call conditions and action
status atoms that a does not believe to be true in r’s state.
We also write Sext for this extended software package and distinguish it from the
original S from which we started.
The functions introduced in the previous definition will be used in the definition of
the mapping Trans and the formulation of the properties corresponding to belief
table and belief semantics compatibility (see Equation 7). They also play a role in
the formulation of our main Theorem 58 (although we often avoid explicitly men-
tioning integrity constraints, action constraints, the action base, and the whole soft-
ware package when we consider an agent’s state).
5.1. Feasible belief status sets
Consider now an agent a with associated structures, Infoa. Suppose BS is an
arbitrary status set. We would first like to identify the conditions that determine
whether it ‘‘makes sense’’ for agent a to hold the set of beliefs prescribed by BS.
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In particular, agent a must use some epistemically well justified criteria to hold a set,
BS, of beliefs. In this section, we introduce the concept of a feasible belief status set.
Intuitively,BS is feasible if and only if it satisfies two types of conditions – conditions
on the agent a, and conditions on the beliefs of agent a about other agents b or
sequences r.
Conditions on agent a:
1. Deontic and action consistency: BS must not contain any inconsistencies. For
example, BS may not contain action status atoms, Oa and Fa as these two ac-
tion status atoms are mutually incompatible. Similarly, the set of actions taken
by agent a must not violate any action constraints, i.e. if Todo 
fa j Doa 2 BSg, then for each ground instance of an action constraint of
the form ActSet - v, either v is false in the current agent state, or
ActSet 6 Todo.
2. Deontic and action closure: This condition says that BS must be closed under
the deontic operations. For example, if Oa 2 BS, then Pa 2 BS, and so on.
3. Closure under rules of BP: Furthermore, if we have a rule in BP having a
ground instance whose body’s code call conditions are all true in the current
agent state, and whose action status atoms and belief literals are true in BS,
then the head of that (ground) rule must be in BS.
4. State consistency: Suppose we concurrently execute all actions in the set Todo.
Then the new state that results must be consistent with the integrity constraints
associated with agent a.
Conditions on beliefs of agent a about other agents b:
5. Local coherence: This condition requires that for any agent b, every induced sta-
tus set Pactionb BS is feasible (in the original sense) with respect to the induced
state Pstateb BS and agent program Pab. Furthermore a similar condition
must hold for any sequence r instead of just b.
6. Compatibility with BTa: We have to ensure that (1) all belief atoms of the basic
belief table are contained in BS and that (2) whenever a belief condition is true,
then the corresponding belief formula is true in BS.
7. Compatibility with BSemTa: If hb;BSemab i is an entry in BSemTa, we have to
ensure that b’s induced state is closed under the semantics BSemab .
8. Consistency of the Beliefs: A (consistent) belief status set should only exist if
there are no inconsistencies in the belief tables (an agent can errenousansy hold
the belief Bab;Fa as well as :Bab;Fa at the same time. Or, even if there is
no explicit such inconsistency, it might result from the facts in the belief table
together with the closure under the semantics in the belief semantics table.
We are now ready to formalize the above eight basic conditions through a
sequence of definitions.
Definition 36 (Deontic/action consistency). A belief status set BS held by agent a is
said to be deontically consistent, if, by definition, it satisfies the following rules for
any ground action a and any sequence r of agents (including the empty sequence):
1. If Oa 2 Pactionr BS, then Wa 62 Pactionr BS.
2. If Pa 2 Pactionr BS, then Fa 62 Pactionr BS.
3. If Pa 2 Pactionr BS, then Pstater BS  Prea (i.e., a is executable in Pstater BS).
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A belief status set BS is called action consistent, if and only if for every ground
action instance, ActSet - v, of an action constraint in AC, either v is false in state
O or BS \ fDoa j a 2 ActSetg  ;.
Intuitively, the requirement of deontic consistency ensures that belief sets are in-
ternally consistent and do not have conflicts about whether an action should or
should not be taken by agent a. Action consistency ensures that the agent cannot
violate action constraints.
At this point, the reader may wonder why we need to ensure that deontic/action
consistency requirements also apply to sequences of agents rather than to just agent
a by itself. The reason is that if we replaced all occurrences of r in the preceding def-
inition by the empty sequence , i.e., we just look at a’s own action status set, then
we may still encounter deontic inconsistencies nested within beliefs. For example,
agent a’s belief set could contain both Bab;Oa and Bab;Fa. In this case, agent
a believes that action a is both forbidden and obligatory for agent b – a state of af-
fairs that is clearly inconsistent. It is to rule out such scenarios that we have defined
deontic and action consistency as above.
The following definition specifies what it means for a belief status set to be deon-
tically closed.
Definition 37 (Deontically closed belief status set). Suppose BS is a belief status set
held by agent a. BS is said to be deontically closed if and only if the following con-
dition holds:
if Oa 2 Pactionr BS then Pa 2 Pactionr BS,
where a is any ground action and r is any sequence of agents. We say that BS is de-
ontically closed if, by definition, BS  D-Cl BS.
Intuitively, BS is deontically closed if for every agent sequence r, if agent a be-
lieves that action a is obligatory wrt. sequence r, then a must also believe that a
is permitted wrt. r. The following lemma establishes that given any belief status
set, there exists a unique minimal (wrt. set inclusion) superset of it that is deontically
closed.
Lemma 38. Suppose BS is a belief status set held by agent a. Then there is a belief
status set denoted D-Cl BS such that:
1. BS  D-Cl BS and
2. D-Cl BS is deontically closed and
3. Every other deontically closed superset ofBS is a superset of D-Cl BS.
Proof. First note that the set of all ground status atoms satisfies conditions (1) and
(2) above. So all we have to show is that such a minimal extension of BS exists. Let
us define a sequence BSi, where BS0 def BS and
BSi1 def BSi [ fBab;Pa jBab;Oa 2 BSig:
Obviously,
S
BSi is a minimal extension ofBS as required in the statement. The gen-
eral case for arbitrary sequences r instead of just [b ] is analogous.
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The unique minimal status set that is a superset of BS and which is deontically
closed is called the deontic closure of BS.
Definition 39 (Deontic closure D-Cl BS). Suppose BS is a belief status set held by
agent a. The deontic closure of BS, denoted D-Cl BS, is the smallest superset ofBS
that is deontically closed.
Just as in the case of deontically closed sets, a belief status set is said to be action
closed if, by definition, whenever agent a believes action a is obligatory for some
agent sequence, then it must also believe that that agent sequence will do it. Further-
more, if it believes action a is done by some agent sequence, then it must also believe
that that agent sequence is permitted to do it.
Definition 40 (Action closed belief status set). Suppose BS is a belief status set held
by agent a. BS is said to be action closed if, by definition, the following conditions
hold:
1. if Oa 2 Pactionr BS, then Doa 2 Pactionr BS,
2. if Doa 2 Pactionr BS, then Pa 2 Pactionr BS,
As in the case of deontically closed belief status sets, if BS is any belief status set,
there is a unique minimal (wrt. set inclusion) superset of BS which is action closed.
This is the gist of the following lema.
Lemma 41. Suppose BS is a belief status set held by agent a. Then there is a unique
belief status set, denoted A-Cl BS, such that:
1. BS  A-Cl BS and
2. A-Cl BS is action closed and
3. There is no strict subset of A-Cl BS satisfying the preceding two conditions.
Proof. We have to show that such a minimal extension of BS exists and follow the
proof of the preceding lemma. We define a sequence BSi, where BS0 def BS and
BSi1 def BSi [ fBab;Pa jBab;Doa 2 BSig
[ fBab;Doa jBab;Oa 2 BSig:
Obviously,
S
BSi is a minimal extension of BS as required in the statement. As in
the previous lemma, the general case for arbitrary sequences r instead of just [b ]
is analogous.
In view of the above theorem, we call A-Cl BS the action closure of BS.
Definition 42 (Action closure A-Cl BS). Suppose BS is a belief status set held by
agent a. The action closure of BS, denoted A-Cl BS, is the smallest superset of
BS that is action closed.
We are now ready to start defining the notion of closure of a belief status set, BS,
under the rules of a map, BP. First, we define an operator, AppBP;OBS that takes
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as input, a belief status set, BS, and produces as output, another belief status set,
obtained by applying the rules in BP with respect to the state O once.
Definition 43 (Operator AppBP;OBS). Suppose BP is a map, and O is an agent
state. Then, AppBP;OBS is defined to be the set of all ground action status atoms
A such that there exists a rule in BP having a ground instance of the form
r : A L1; . . . ; Ln, which we denote by
A Bccr [ Bÿccr [ Botherr [ Bÿotherr
(in order to distinguish between positive/negative occurrences of code call atoms and
non-code call atoms, i.e., action status literals and belief literals) such that:
1. Botherr  BS and ::Bÿotherr \BS  ;, and
2. every code call v 2 Bccr succeeds in O, and
3. every code call v 2 ::Bÿccr does not succeed in O, and
4. for every atom Opa 2 Br [ fAg such that Op 2 fP;O;Dog, the action a is
executable in state O.
Intuitively, the operator AppBP;OBS closes BS by applying all rules of the map
BP once. The following example shows how this operator works, using our familiar
RAMP example.
Example 44 (AppBP;OBS for RAMP). We continue with Example 29 and consider
the following belief status set for heli1:
BS1heli1 def fBheli1tank1; inpointB; tank1 : getPos ;
PflypointA; pointC; 5000; 100;PattackpointC; pointBg
Then AppBP;OBS1heli1  fPattackpointA; pointBg.
Note that no belief atoms are present, because the definition of App only specifies
program rule heads and we cannot have belief atoms in rule heads. In addition the
atoms PflypointA; pointC; 5000; 100 and PattackpointC; pointB were not pre-
served because there are no rules to support them.
Definition 45 (Program closure). A belief status set, BS, is said to be closed with
respect to a map, BP, and an agent state, O, if, by definition, AppBP;OBS 
fOpa j Opa 2 BS where Op 2 fO;W;P;F;Dogg.
Intuitively, this definition says that when we restrict BS to the action status
atoms associated with agent a, then the set of action status atoms that the map,
BP, makes true in the current state, is equal to the set of action status atoms
already true in BS. The following example builds upon the previous one, and
explains why certain belief status sets, BS, satisfy the program closure condition,
while others do not.
In the preceding example the belief status set BS1heli1 does not satisfy the pro-
gram closure property because AppBP;OBS1heli1 is not equal to
fOpa j Opa 2 BSg
 fPflypointA; pointC; 5000; 100;PattackpointC; pointBg:
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However, supose we add the following two rules to heli1’s program:
PflypointA; pointC; 5000; 100  
PattackpointC; pointB  
In this case, the belief status set BS2heli1 satisfies the program closure rule:
BS2heli1 def fBheli1tank1; inpointB; tank : getPos ;
PflypointA; pointC; 5000; 100;
PattackpointC; pointB;
PattackpointA; pointBg:
Then AppBP;OBS2heli1 is given by the three action status atoms
PattackpointA; pointB;
PattackpointC; pointB;
PflypointA; pointC; 5000; 100:
Finally, we have the state consistency:
Definition 46 (State consistency). We require that O0S  IC, where O0S  apply
Do BS;OS is the state which results after concuerrently executing all actions in
Do BS on the state OS.
At this point, we have finished describing the requirements on agent a that must
be true. In addition, we must specify conditions on the beliefs that agent a holds
about other agents b. To some extent, this has already been done in the definitions
of deontic and action consistency/closure. However, more coherent conditions need
to be articulated. The first of these is the fact that the beliefs held by agent a about
another agent b must be coherent. For instance, if a believes that it is obligatory
for agent b to do action a, then a must also believe that b will do a. Other, similar
conditions also apply. This condition may be expressed through the following
definition.
Definition 47 (Local coherence). A belief status set, BS, held by agent a is said to be
locally coherent wrt. a sequence, r of agents if, by definition, the induced status set
Pactionr BS is feasible in the sense of Definition 64 and Refs. [21,19] with respect
to the induced state Pstater BS and agent program Par.
BS is said to be locally coherent if, by definition, BS is coherent with respect to all
sequences, r, of agents.
The above definition makes explicit reference to the definition of feasible status
set, provided by Refs. [21,19]. It is important to note that Pactionr BS is a set of ac-
tion status atoms, and that Pstater BS involves no belief literals, and Par is an
agent program with no belief modalities, as defined earlier in Definition 15. Here
are a few examples of what it means for a belief status set held by agent a to be
locally coherent.
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Example 48 (Local coherence). Let
BSheli2 def fBheli2heli1;PflyPointA; PointB; 1000; 100;
Bheli2heli1; in100; heli1 : getSpeed ;
Bheli2heli1; in1000; heli1 : getAltitude g
and let heli1’s program as believed by heli2 (we denote it by Pheli2heli1) be:
PflyX; Y; A; S  inS; heli1 : getSpeed ; inA; heli1 : getAltitude :
The set BSheli2 is locally coherent wrt. the sequence heli2. Notice that:
Pactionheli1 BSheli2 def fPflyPointA; PointB; 1000; 100g
is feasible with respect to:
Pstateheli1BSheli2  fin100; heli1 : getSpeed ;
in1000; heli1 : getAltitude g:
Let
BStank1 def fBtank1heli2;Bheli2heli1;PflyPointA; PointB; 1000; 100;
Btank1heli2;Bheli2heli1; in100; heli1 : getSpeed ;
Btank1heli2;Bheli2heli1; in1000; heli1 : getAltitude g
and let the Ptank1heli2; heli1 be the program tank1 believes heli2 believes heli1
has:
PflyX; Y; A; S  inS; heli1 : getSpeed ; inA; heli1 : getAltitude :
Then BStank1 is locally coherent wrt. the sequence heli2; heli1. Just like in the
previous example: Pactionheli2;heli1BStank1  fPflyPointA; PointB; 1000; 100g is
feasible with respect to:
Pstateheli2;heli1BStank1  fin100; heli1 : getSpeed ;
in1000; heli1 : getAltitude g:
In addition to being locally coherent, for a belief status set to be considered fea-
sible, we need to ensure that it does not ignore the contents of the belief table of
agent a. This may be encoded through the following condition.
Definition 49 (Compatibility with BTa). Suppose hh;/; vBi is in BTa. BS is said to
be compatible with hh;/; vBi if, by definition, either
1. h partvB is false wrt. Pstateh BSor a partvB is false wrt. a’s state OS, or
2. (a) if / is a code call condition or an action status atom then Bah;/ 2 BS,
(b) if / is a negated belief literal of the form :Bhc;w, then Bhc;w 62 BS,
(c) if / is an arbitrary conjunction of belief literals, /  /1 ^    ^ /n then (a) and
(b) apply to all /i separately.
BS is said to be compatible with BTa if, by definition, it is compatible with all tu-
ples in BTa.
Intuitively, this condition says that if a row in the belief table of agent a has a
‘‘true’’ condition, then agent a must hold the corresponding belief about the agent
h in question. The following example illustrates this concept of compatibility.
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Example 50 (Compatibility). We continue with Table 3. We define
BStank1 def fBtank1heli1; inpos1; heli1 : getPos g:
BS(tank1) is compatible with BTa.
However, the following belief set is not compatible with the given belief table:
BStank1  finpos1; tank1 : getPos g:
This is because there is a true condition in the first row of the table but the belief set
does not contain
Btank1heli1; inpos1; heli1 : getPos 
according to the definition of compatibility.
The last condition in defining feasible belief status sets is that for any agent b, the
beliefs agent a holds about agent b must be closed under the notion of entailment
that agent a thinks agent b uses.
Definition 51 (Compatibility with BSemTa). Suppose hb;BSemab i is an entry in
BSemTa, and BS is a belief status set. Let BSb  fv j :Bab; v 2 BSg.
BS is said to be compatible with hb;BSemab i if, by definition,
fv0 j BSb BSema
b
v0g  BS:
BS is said to be compatible with BSemTa if, by definition, BS is compatible with
every entry in BSemTa.
The last property we need is the consistency of the belief table and the belief se-
mantics table.
Definition 52 (Belief consistency). We require that a belief status set is consistent
with respect to beliefs hold by agent a about other agents, i.e., that it does not con-
tain a belief atom u and its negation :u. Such a set is called belief consistent wrt.
agent a.
We are now ready to define feasible belief status sets.
Definition 53 (Feasible belief status set). A belief status set, BS held by agent a, is
said to be feasible with respect to a meta-agent program, BP, an agent state, O,
and a set IC of integrity constraints, and a set AC of action constraints if, by def-
inition, BS satisfies our eight conditions stated above (deontically and action consis-
tent, deontically and action closed, closed under the mapBP’s rules, state consistent,
locally coherent, compatible with BTa, compatible with BSemTa and belief-consis-
tent).
We illustrate the concept of a feasible belief status set in the example below.
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Example 54 (Feasible belief status sets). Let the mapof heli1 be the following:
r1: PattackP1; P2  Bheli1tank1; inP2; tank1 : getPos ,
PflyP1; P3; A; S,
PattackP3; P2.
r2: OattackP1; P2  PflyRouteP0; P1; P2; P3; S,
Bheli1tank1; inP2; tank1 : getPos .
r3: Pattackpos3; pos1  
r4: Pflypos0; pos3; 5000; 100  
Let the set of IC be given as
inS; heli : getSpeed  & S < MaxSpeed
inA; heli : getAltitude  & A < MaxAltitude
and suppose the set AC contains the following action constraints:
fattackP1; P2; attackP3; P4g - P1  P3 & P2 6 P4
Let
BSheli1 def fBheli1tank1; inpos1; tank1 : getPos ;
Bheli1heli1; inpos2; heli2 : getPos ;
Pflypos0; pos3; 5000; 100;
Bheli1heli2;Pflypos0; pos1; 10000; 200;
Bheli1heli2; in200; heli2 : getSpeed ;
Bheli1heli2; in10000; heli2 : getAltitude ;
Pattackpos3; pos1;
Pattackpos0; pos1g:
Then, we have
Pactionheli2 BSheli1  fPflypos0; pos1; 10000; 200g
Pstateheli2BSheli1  fin200; heli2 : getSpeed ; in10000; heli2 : getAltitude g
Pstatetank1BSheli1  finpos1; tank1 : getPos g
Let the belief table of heli1 be Table 4. Finally let Pheli1heli2 be:
PflyX; Y; A; S  inS; heli2 : getSpeed ; inA; heli2 : getAltitude :
Then, the belief status set BSheli1 is feasible with respect to the above map, AC
and IC. Note that BSheli1 satisfies all of the 8 conditions. It is deontically and
action consistent, because BSheli1 does not contain any inconsistencies; although
Pflypos0; pos3; 5000; 100 is in BSheli1, the action status atom F flypos0;
pos3; 5000; 100 is not.
BSheli1 is deontically and action closed beacuse Pactionheli2 BSheli1 does not
contain any inconistency. It is closed under the map. Note that the set
AppBP;OBS2heli1 is given by
fPattackpos0; pos1;Pattackpos3; pos1;Pflypos0; pos3; 5000; 100g:
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BSheli1 is locally coherent with respect to the sequence heli2. Note that
Pactionheli2 BSheli1  fPflypos0; pos1; 10000; 200g
is feasible with respect to
Pstateheli2BSheli1  fin200; heli2 : getSpeed ;
in10000; heli2 : getAltitude g
Moreover, BSheli1 is also locally coherent with respect to the sequence tank1 as
Pactiontank1BSheli1  ;.
BSheli1 is compatible with BTheli1. The following belief status set is also
feasible:
BS1heli1 def fBheli1tank1; inpos1; tank1 : getPos ;
Bheli1heli2; inpos2; heli2 : getPos ;
Pflypos0; pos3; 5000; 100;
PflyRoutepoint1; point2; point3; point4; S;
Bheli1heli2;Pflypos0; pos1; 10000; 200;
Bheli1heli2; in200; heli2 : getSpeed ;
Bheli1heli2; in10000; heli2 : getAltitude ;
Pattackpos3; pos1;
Pattackpos0; pos1 g:
Now consider the following belief status set for heli1, with the same map, belief ta-
ble, AC and IC.
BS2heli1 def fBheli1tank1; inpos1; tank1 : getPos ;
Pflypos0; pos3; 5000; 100;
Bheli1heli2;Pflypos0; pos1; 10000; 200;
Bheli1heli2; in200; heli2 : getSpeed ;
Bheli1heli2; in10000; heli2 : getAltitude ;
Pattackpos3; pos1;
Pattackpos0; pos1 g:
BS2heli1 is not feasible because it is not compatible with BTheli1. This is because
BS2heli1 does not contain Bheli1heli2; inpos2; heli1 : getPos .
The following belief status set of heli1 is also not feasible:
BS3heli1 def fBheli1tank1; inpos1; tank1 : getPos ;
Bheli1heli2; inpos2; heli2 : getPos ;
Pflypos0; pos3; 5000; 100;
Bheli1heli2;Pflypos0; pos1; 10000; 200;
Bheli1heli2; in200; heli2 : getSpeed ;
Bheli1heli2; in10000; heli2 : getAltitude g:
The reason is that it is not closed under the map BP’s rules, as
AppBP;OBS3heli1  fPattackpos0; pos1g:
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Finally, the following belief status set is also not feasible:
BS4heli1 def fBheli1tank1; inpos1; tank1 : getPos ;
Bheli1heli2; inpos2; heli2 : getPos ;
Pflypos0; pos3; 5000; 100;
F flypos0; pos3; 5000; 100;
Bheli1heli2;Pflypos0; pos1; 10000; 200;
Bheli1heli2; in200; heli2 : getSpeed ;
Bheli1heli2; in10000; heli2 : getAltitude ;
Pattackpos3; pos1;
Pattackpos0; pos1g:
It is not deontically consistent as both Pa and Fa is in BS4heli1, where
a  flypos0; pos3; 5000; 100.
5.2. Rational belief status sets
The notion of a rational belief status set is a useful strengthening of feasible belief
status sets. The idea is that all executed actions should be grounded or justified by the
meta agent program. As a simple example, consider a feasible belief status set and
add a Doa atom for an action a that does not occur in any rule of the program or
in the action and integrity constraints at all. It is immediate that this new set is a fea-
sible belief status set. However it is not minimal as there is no reason to believe Doa.
Rational sets, defined below, rule out such non-minimal status sets:
Definition 55 (Groundedness; rational belief status set). A belief status set BSwhich is
locally coherent, compatible with BTa, and compatible with BSemTa is grounded, if
there exists no belief status setBS0 strictly contained inBS (BS0  BS) such thatBS0
satisfies the following three conditions of a feasible belief status set as given in Def-
inition 53: deontically and action consistent, deontically and action closed, closed
under the map BP’s rules.
A belief status set BS is a rational status set, if BS is a feasible belief status set and
BS is grounded.
If we compare the above definition with the original definition of a belief status set
(Definition 53), the reader will note that only the state consistency requirement is not
explicitly required while minimizingBS0. In contrast, the local coherence and the two
compatibility conditions are required and do not guide the minimization process. If
state consistency were added to the minimization policy, then an agent would be
forced to execute actions in order to satisfy the integrity constraints. However, such
actions may not be mentioned at all by the program, and thus it seems unreasonable
to execute them. Of course, state consistency is guaranteed, because we check
groundedness only for feasible belief status sets.
5.3. Reasonable belief status sets
As shown in Refs. [21,19] for programs without beliefs, rational belief status sets
allow the arbitrary contraposition of rules, which is often not intended. For example
the program consisting of the simple rule
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Do a  :Do b
has two rational belief status sets: S1  fDo a;Pag, and S2  fDo b;Pbg. S2
seems less intuitive because there is no rule in the program to justify deriving Do b.
This leads, in analogy to Refs. [21,19] to the following notion:
Definition 56 (Reasonable belief status set). Let BP be an agent program, let OS be
an agent state, and let BS be a belief status set.
1. If BP is a positive meta agent program, then BS is a reasonable belief status set
for P on OS, if, by definition, BS is a rational belief status set for P on OS.
2. The reduct of BP wrt. BS and OS, denoted by red
BSBP;OS, is the program
which is obtained from the ground instances of the rules in BP over OS as fol-
lows.
(a) First, remove every rule r such that Bÿotherr \BS 6 ;;
(b) Remove all atoms in Bÿotherr from the remaining rules.
Then BS is a reasonable belief status set for BP wrt. OS, if it is a reasonable
belief status set of the (positive) meta agent program redBSBP;OS with respect
to OS.
6. How to implement meta agent programs?
Meta Agent Programs significantly extend agent programs by allowing us to rea-
son about beliefs. However the IMPACT-platform developed at the University of
Maryland eciently implements a polynomial class of agent programs. This brings
up the question of whether we can take advantage of this work. In fact, as we show
in this section, this can be done by
1. transforming meta agent programs into agent programs, and
2. taking advantage of extended code calls Sext as introduced in Definition 35.
The first step is a source-to-source transformation: the belief atoms in a meta
agent program are replaced by suitable code calls to the new datastructures. We also
note that the second step is indispensable, as every agent dealing with meta agent
programs needs to deal with Belief Tables, Belief Semantics Tables and some func-
tions operating on them.
Let us illustrate the transformation with the following simplified example. Recall
that we already introduced extended code call conditions in Definition 35: those also
involve the new datatypes (belief table and belief semantics table). Suppose the belief
table does not contain any belief conditions (i.e., it coincides with its basic belief
table). Then if v is any code call condition of agent c, the extended code call atom
inhc; v; truei; a : belief table 
corresponds to the belief atom
Bac; v:
However, this does not mean that we can just replace the latter expression by the for-
mer. The problem is that beliefs need not neccessarily be stored in the belief table.
They can also be triggered by entries in the belief table and/or in the belief semantics
table. In fact, this was why we explicitly formulated condition (7) on compatibility
with the belief semantics table. Furthermore if the third entry in the belief table,
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the belief condition, is present, then the first two entries of this triple specify a belief
that must hold. Therefore we use the additional function
a : bel ccc actr;
which was introduced in Definition 35 and thus implement belief atoms with extend-
ed code calls:
in‘‘v’’; a : bel ccc actc
What happens if the formula v is not a code call, but again a belief formula, say
Bcd; v0? An expression of the form inBcd; v0; a : bel ccc actc is not a well-
formed formula in our framework (recall that a : bel ccc actr returns a set of code
call conditions and action status atoms but no belief formulae). In fact, even if it
were, it would not help in reducing the belief atoms to something involving only
extended code calls. Here is where the inductive definition of Trans comes in. We
map
Bac;Bcd; v0
to
in‘‘v 0’’; a : bel ccc actc;d:
Our main theorem in this section states that there is indeed a uniform transformation
Trans from arbitrary meta agent programs (which can also contain nested beliefs)
to agent programs such that the semantics are preserved:
SemBP  SemTransBP; 6
where Sem is either the feasible, rational or reasonable belief status set semantics.
Definition 57 (Trans). Recall (cf. Definition 18) the maximal belief language BLa1
associated with an agent a. We define the mapping
Trans : BLa1 ! Code Call Conditions of Sext
by induction on the structure of belief literals:
Level 0 : If bel lit is a code call condition or an action status atom, then
Transbel lit def bel lit.
Level 1 : If bel lit has the form :Bab;/ where / is a code call condition or an
action status atom, then
1. TransBab;/7!in‘‘/’’; a : bel ccc actb,
2. Trans:Bab;/7!in‘‘/’’; a : not bel ccc actb,
[Level n 1:] If bel lit has the form :Bab;/ where / is of level n, then we de-
fine TransBab;/ by
in‘‘v’’; a : bel ccc actb; q if Trans/  in‘‘v’’ ; a : bel ccc actq
and we define Trans:Bab;/ by
in‘‘v’’; a : not bel ccc actb; q if Trans/  in‘‘v’’; a : bel ccc actq:
Linear extension to BLa1: Thus far Trans is only defined on belief literals and
not on arbitrary belief formulae (which can be arbitrary conjunctions of belief
literals (see Definition 18)). However we can easily extend Trans:
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Transbel lit1 ^ . . . ^ bel litn Transbel lit1 ^    ^Transbel litn:
For a belief status setBS we denote byTransactionBS the subset of all action status
atoms in BS. This is exactly the status set as defined in Definition 60 for agent pro-
grams without beliefs.
For a belief status set BS and an agent b 2A, we also define:
TransstateBS; b def fv j Bab; v 2 BS and v is a code call conditiong
TransactionBS; bdef fOpa~t j Ba b;Opa~t 2 BS;2 g:
As in Definition 32, these definitions are easily extended to arbitrary sequences r
instead of just b.
The transformation Trans maps all belief literals into extended code call condi-
tions and will be used to map any set containing belief literals (like belief status sets
or meta agent programs) into sets without belief literals, but containing extended
code calls. In addition, Trans can be easily applied to BP:
TransBP: this is the programBP where all ocurrences of belief literals bel_lit
have been replaced by Transbel lit.
Thus Trans naturally defines an agent program without beliefs and thus we can use
an existing implementation for agent programs to compute them.
Although the mapping Trans is very simple, some more work is needed in order
to get the above claimed equivalence result. Namely, in the definition of a feasible
belief status set we have explicitly required compatibility with the belief table and
the belief semantics table (see Definitions 49 and 22). If we use Trans to get rid
of all belief atoms in a belief status set by transforming them into code calls, then
we need to formulate similar conditions in terms of code calls. Otherwise we can
not expect a strong equivalence result to hold. The following picture may help to
clarify the problem:
7
It will be easy to show that if the conditions on the left side are fulfilled, and BS
belongs to the semantics Sem of BP, then S belongs to the semantics Sem of P.
However, in order to reduce the semantics of meta agent programs to those of agent
programs we must also have the converse, namely that all S’s of P on the right hand
side are induced by BS’s on the left-hand side. Such a result can only hold if we have
corresponding conditions (indicated by ‘‘???’’ in the above diagram) on the right-
hand side.
2 where Op 2 fO;W;P;F;Dog:
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The way we solve this problem is
1. to extend the original set of integrity constraints IC by a new constraint which
expresses the compatibility with the belief semantics table using the new functions
now available in Sext,
2. to add a new condition (which can not be expressed as an integrity constraint)
which ensures the compatibility with the belief table.
To handle 1. we denote by ICext the set IC of original integrity constraints aug-
mented with the following extended integrity constraints (one for each agent
b 2A):
inhb;BSemab i; a : belief sem table  &
in‘‘v’’; a : bel ccc actb &
intrue; a : bel semanticsb; ‘‘v’’; ‘‘v0’’
)
in‘‘v0’’; a : bel ccc actb:
Note that for ease of notation we assume that the formulae v; v0 are just code call
conditions. In general, they can be arbitrary belief formulae (as determined by
BSemab ). In this case, we have to take their transformation as provided by Trans.
To be more precise, we have to add the constraints:
inhb;BSemab i; a : belief sem table  &
intrue; a : bel semanticsb; ‘‘v’’; ‘‘ v0’’ &
Transv
)
Transv0
To handle 2. we require the following condition:
Closure: Let the state OSext satisfy inhb;/; vBi; a : belief table  as well as
a partvB and letTransstateBS; b satisfy b partvB. Let further / be a code call
condition or an action status atom,
1. If / is a code call condition or an action status atom, then OSext satisfies
in/; a : bel ccc actb.
2. If / is of the form Bbc;/0, where /0 is a code call condition or an action
status atom, then OSext satisfies in‘‘/0’’; a : bel ccc actb; c.
3. If / is of the form :Bbc;/0, where /0 is a code call condition or an action
status atom, then OSext satisfies in‘‘/0’’; a : not bel ccc actb; c.
4. More generally, if / is a nested belief atom, then we can associate with this
atom a sequence q (as introduced in Definition 31) and we require that OSext
satisfies in‘‘/0’’; a : bel ccc actq. Similarly, if / is a negated nested belief
literal, we require that OSext satisfies in‘‘/0’’; a : not bel ccc actq.
Thus we end up with the following picture:
8
The following theorem and its corollaries make statement (6) precise.
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Theorem 58 (Implementing belief programs by agent programs). Let BP be a meta
agent program, a 2A, OSext a state of agent a, IC a set of integrity constraints, and
AC a set of action constraints for a.
If BS is a feasible belief status set of agent a wrt. BP; OSext , IC and AC, then
1. TransactionBS is a feasible status set of TransBP wrt. OSext and ICext. In ad-
dition OSext satisfies Closure.
2. for all sequences r:TransactionBS; r is a feasible status set wrt.Transstate BS; r
and Par, where inPar; a : action programr is true in OSext .
Moreover, every feasible status set ofTransBP for a state OSext and ICext where
OSext satisfies Closure is obtained in that way.
Proof. We first show 1 and 2. Let BS be a feasible belief status set of agent a wrt.
BP, OSext , IC and AC. Trans
actionBS is certainly a status set of TransBP:
it consists just of certain action status atoms for TransBP. To check feasibility
of this set, we have to check (1) closure under program rules, (2) deontic and action
consistency, (3) deontic and action closure and (4) state consistency. All these proper-
ties are immediate from the corresponding conditions for BS (see S1 of Definition 64
for (1), Definition 61 for (2), Lemmas 61 and 62 for (3), state consistency is analo-
gousansy to (4) defined, and note that TransactionBS; r and TransstateBS; r cor-
respond to Pactionr BS and Pstater BS).
Why is ICext true and why does OSext satisfy Closure? IC
ext follows by the belief
semantics compatibility condition and Closure by the belief table compatibility.
The condition 2 is implied by local coherence.
Now we have to prove the converse, namely that every feasible status set of
TransBP for a state OSext and ICext where OSext satisfies Closure is obtained in
that way. Let S be such a feasible status set. Then we reconstruct BSnew using the
code calls a : bel ccc actq. Whenever OSext satisfies a code call atom
in‘‘v’’; a : bel ccc actb; q
where ‘‘v’’ is a code call atom of the form ‘‘ in/; :  ’’ or an action status atom,
then we add Bab; v to BSnew. Whenever OSext satisfies a code call atom
in‘‘v’’; a : not bel ccc actb; q
where ‘‘v’’ is a code call atom of the form ‘‘in/; :  ’’ or an action status atom,
then we add :Bab; v to BSnew.
Note that because of the Closure condition, such code call atoms must hold and
satisfy (if retransformed to belief formulae) the belief table compatibility condition.
By construction, BSnew is a status set and the feasibility is guarantueed by the feasib-
lity of S and the conditions we have just mentioned.
Corollary 59 (Invariance of TransBP). If BS is a rational (respectively, reason-
able) belief status set of agent a wrt. BP, OSext , IC and AC, then
1. TransactionBS is a rational (respectively, reasonable) status set of TransBP
wrt. OSext satisfying Closure and wrt. IC
ext,
2. for all sequences r: TransactionBS; r is a rational (respectively, reasonable) sta-
tus set wrt. TransstateBS; r and Par, where inPar; a : action programr
is true in OSext .
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Moreover, every rational (respectively, reasonable) status set of TransBP for a
state OSext and IC
ext where OSext satisfies Closure is obtained in that way.
Proof. We distinguish between rational and reasonable status sets. As the latter are
based on the former we first consider rational sets.
Rational: Using Theorem 58, it only remains to prove that every BS which is locally
coherent, compatible with BTa and with BSemTa satisfies:
BS is grounded wrt: BP if and only if TransBS is grounded wrt: TransBP:
This equivalence is easily shown by comparing the operators given in Definition 43
for programs with beliefs and Definition 63 for programs without. Note that the
transformation Trans ensures that all belief literals of BP are transformed into
extended code call conditions and these code call conditions are taken care of by
our conditions (Closure and ICext). A detailed inspection shows that every applica-
tion of AppBP;OSBS corresponds exactly to an application of AppTransBP;OSextTransBS and thus the result follows.
Reasonable: Here we have to show that applying Trans  is compatible with the re-
duction operation:
TransredBSBP;OSext  redTransBSTransBP;OSext:
The result then follows immediately by the definition of reasonable status sets, which
are based on rational sets for positive programs. The problem is therefore reduced to
the former case.
That the condition above holds follows immediately be the very definition of red.
As we have a one-one correspondence between the body atoms of BP and those of
TransBP, a rule in BP is removed if and only if the corresponding rule in
TransBP is removed.
Theorem 58 and Corollary 59 are extremely important. In eect, they say that
dealing with beliefs can be reduced to dealing with the specific belief related data
structures (belief table and belief semantics table) introduced in this paper. As a con-
sequence, a system for meta agent programs does not have to be implemented from
scratch – instead, the IMPACT agent program development environment developed
in Ref. [20] may be used directly as a computational engine for processing agents
that reason with beliefs. Ref. [20] describes an implementation of ordinary agent
programs (not maps) for a class of agent programs called regular agent programs
which are guaranteed to be polynomially evaluable. Regular agent programs gener-
alize the well known concept of stratification in logic programming. It is possible to
define a notion of a regular map in such a way that a map BP is considered to be
regular if and only if the regular agent program TransBP is regular. The eect of
this would be that for regular maps, computation of feasible belief status sets can be
done polynomially – the reader can easily verify that TransBP is polynomially
computable.
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7. Strengths and shortcomings
An agent designer will use meta-agent programs for specifying the operating prin-
ciples of his agent in those cases where agents need to reason with beliefs about other
agents’ states and/or actions. In this section, we overview the strengths and weak-
nesses of maps for this purpose.
Strengths:
• maps work with data stored in arbitrary data structures and can be built on top of
existing legacy code or code developed in specialized languages. No theory of
agenthood is likely to be of practical use without this property, as most real world
data is not stored in logical form.
• An agent designer can use a map to couple arbitrary actions to the operating prin-
ciples of agent – in other words, arbitrary actions can be coupled to agent state
changes. Such actions can be mundane actions such as creating files, mailing files,
executing queries, updating data, or supposedly ‘‘more intelligent’’ actions such as
updating beliefs, resolving contradictions, creating plans and schedules, etc.
• One consequence of the above facts is that our framework is highly flexible – the
semantics of maps should not and does not depend upon a specific belief update
mechanism or a specific contradiction removal mechanism,but rather uses these as
‘‘pluggable’’ parameters. This is theoretically clean and practically useful because
dierent applications are likely to use dierent belief update mechanism (or in
many cases none at all) and dierent contradiction removal mechanisms. An agent
system should allow the designer this flexibility, rather than imposing a predeter-
mined choice on him (though such predetermined options may well reside in a li-
brary such as an action library we are building in IMPACT).
• Another major strength of our framework is the transformation Trans which
converts any map in polynomial time into an ordinary agent program. As de-
scribed in Refs. [20] and [51, ch. 13], there is a current existing implementation
of a polynomial class of ordinary agent programs that has been shown to scale
up well to large data sets (e.g., a logistics application built in IMPACT computes
joins involving approximately 49 billion tuples over heterogeneous Oracle and
multi-record nested file structures in about 40 s over a network). Note that this
implementation is a first order implementation, not propositional (as is the case
with almost all implementations of belief logics).
• It is important to note that the designer of an agent a may choose to make the
agent program, integrity constraints, action constraints etc. of agent part of a’s
state if he so desires. Thus the agent’s behavior can be autonomousansy modified
by tha agent itself if the agent designer provides a with actions to do so.
Weaknesses: The proposed map paradigm also has some weaknesses.
• The first weakness is that agent a guesses an agent program of agent b rather than
guessing a meta-agent program of b . Such an extension is challenging becuase it
makes the semantics of maps computationally much more complex and in all like-
lihood, will result in the use of Kripke-style model theory. The computational
complexity of such semantics are very high even in the propositional, and first
order belief logics are highly undecidable (see Ref. [22]). Thus, there is a tradeo
between expressiveness and implementability, which we made.
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• It may also be argued that agents may hold disjunctive beliefs or probabilistic be-
liefs about other agents. This cannot be modeled in our current framework.
Again, it is well known that disjunctive reasoning is computationally more expen-
sive than definite reasoning – hence, future research may focus on including dis-
junctive or probabilistic beliefs in maps without increasing the computational
complexity of map computations.
• We have not given explicit mechanisms for belief updating and contradiction re-
moval in this paper. Though this may be considered a weakness, one strength of
our framework is its ability to ‘‘plug in’’ such mechanisms (several of which have
been developed by researchers across the world) into maps directly. maps provide
a framework that builds on top of such modules that may be selected by the agent
designer, rather than ramming them down an agent designer’s unwilling throat.
8. Related work
In this paper, we have provided a framework within which an agent may reason
about the beliefs it has about other agents’ states, beliefs and possible actions. Our
framework builds upon classical logic programming results. As there has been con-
siderable work on these areas, we try to relate our work with the most relevant of
these works. We do not explicitly relate ordinary agent programs [21,19] with other
agent systems, as that has been done in great detail in Ref. [21]. Rather, we focus
primarily on meta-reasoning capabilities of agents and compare maps with meta rea-
soning capabilities of other agent frameworks.
In Ref. [32] The authors developed an agent architecture that uses logical rules ex-
pressed in Horn clause-like syntax, to encode agent behavior – both rational and re-
active. The reactive agent rules are of the form
a condition;
where a is an action, and the condition in the body of the rule is a logical condition.
Rationality is captured through integrity constraints. In the current language of Ref.
[32], there seems to be no obvious support for meta-reasoning, though no doubt it
could be encoded in, via some use of the metalogical demo predicate [31].
Ref. [46] showed how extended logic programming may be used to specify the be-
havior of a diagnostic agent. They propose an architecture that supports cooperation
between multiple diagnostic agents. Issues of interest arise when conflicting diagnos-
es are hypothesized by dierent agents. Their architecture consists of a knowledge
base implemented by an extended logic program [2], and inference machine that em-
bodies the REVISE algorithm [17] for eliminating contraditions, and a control layer.
No meta-reasoning issues are brought up explicitly in this work.
Concurrently with our eort, the authors of Refs. [38,37] have developed a logic
programming based framework called CaseLP that may be used to implement mul-
tiagent applications by building on top of existing software. As in our work, agents
have states, and states are changed by the agents’ actions, and the behavior of an
agent is encoded through rules. No meta-reasoning issues are brought up explicitly
in this work.
Ref. [41] was one of the first proposals of a formal extension of auto-epistemic
logic to deal with multiagent reasoning. She extended auto-epistemic logic [40] with
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belief modalities indexed by agent names. She proposed a concept of expansions for
such theories.
The Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) is one of the best known multiagent con-
struction system that implements BDI agents (BDI stands for ‘‘Belief, Desires, Inten-
tionality’’) [17]. This framework has led to several interesting applications including
a practical, deployed application called OASIS for air trac control in Sydney,
Australia. The theory of PRS is captured through a logic based development, in
Ref. [42].
Ref. [25] describes a logic of knowledge and belief to model multiagent coordina-
tion. Their framework permits an agent to reason not only about the world and its
own actions, but also to simulate and model the behavior of other agents in the en-
vironment. In a separate paper [26], they show how one agent can reason with a
probabilistic view of the behavior of other agents so as to achieve coordination. This
is good work.
There are some significant dierences between our work and theirs. First, we focus
on agents that are built on top of arbitrary data structures. Second, our agent meta-
reasoning language is very general – an agent can decide, for instance, that it will rea-
son only with level 1 nested beliefs – and hence, our framework allows dierent
agents to pick the level of belief reasoning appropriate for them. Third, our action
framework is very general as well, and meta-reasoning with permitted, obligatory
and forbidden actions is novel. Fourth, our framework allows an agent to ‘‘plug
in’’ dierent estimates of the semantics used by other agents.
Researchers in the distributed knowledge community have also conducted exten-
sive research into how one agent reasons about its beliefs about other agents (and
their beliefs). Ref. [23] presents a multiagent modal logic where knowledge modali-
ties are indexed by agent names. They provide a semantics for message passing in
such an environment. However, their work is quite dierent from ours.
In contrast to the above bodies of work, we believe that our agent framework pro-
vides a unifying theoretical framework for a variety of AI research including many of
those listed above. Our architecture:
• Builds on arbitrary data structures – a necessary criterion for any practical appli-
cation where lots of legacy code already exists and/or where data structures that
are best suited for the application must be used to support the application.
• Allows agents to use whatever actions they need – for example, one agent may use
one conflict resolution policy and/or belief updating policy, while another agent
may use a dierent one. Resolving conflicts, updating beliefs, performing updates,
inductive learning, planning, etc. – all topics well studied in logic programming –
are all usable within IMPACT agents as actions!
• Allows agents to create new actions from existing ones – we are all aware that
agents often do many things at the same time. An agent that is traveling from
one location to another can update its beliefs at the same time. The notion of con-
currency introduced in this paper is very generic, and allows agents to mix and
match actions to produce new ones!
• Allows agents to reason as little or as much about beliefs as they need – dierent
applications will require dierent levels of sophistication in the reasoning used
by agents. For instance, the coordination agent in the RAMP example needs
to perform sophisticated reasoning about its beliefs about other agents and
the actions they may or may not perform. On the other hand, a relatively
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‘‘dumb’ database agent may only need to know how to respond to user queries.
Such an agent may not need sophisticated belief capabilities. Our framework
allows both.
A variety of open problems exist. These include the ability to perform actions over
widely varying temporal intervals (see Ref. [51, ch. 8]), performing actions in the
presence of dierent types of uncertainty, and scheduling complex actions. Though
time, uncertainty, etc. can all be ‘‘pushed’’ into the agent’s state, techniques are need-
ed to handle them inside such states. For example, the study of uncertainty in rela-
tional databases is far from mature (cf. Refs. [34,16]). Extending such models of
uncertainty to arbitrary data structures is a major challenge. Likewise, while tempo-
ral reasoning in logic is well studied, temporal reasoning over arbitrary data struc-
tures is not well understood (though temporal reasoning in relational databases is
well understood [53, chs. 4–6]). Thus, extending temporal data models to diverse da-
ta structures is an important priority. The mix of time and uncertainty is even more
complex – to our knowledge the only published paper on this topic [18] represents an
excellent start on probabilistic temporal databases, but has many restrictive assump-
tions, some of which are removed in Ref. [15]. Extending probabilistic temporal rea-
soning to diverse data structures poses yet another challenge, especially when actions
that make decisions based on such data must be coupled to the data structures (see
Ref. [51, ch. 9]).
Conclusions
We have seen that the operating principles governing how an agent acts, may, in
many applications, be based upon the agent’s beliefs about other agents’ states,
beliefs, and possible courses of actions. In order to eectively support such applica-
tions, we have proposed the notions of belief tables, and belief semantics tables, cul-
minating in the definition of a Meta Agent Program, or map. We have shown that
our map framework is rich enough to encode fairly complex meta-reasoning needs,
such as those arising in the context of the RAMP example.
We have developed a formal semantics for maps – in particular, if a particular
map BP is associated with an agent a, and the current state of the agent is OS, then
we have indicated what constitutes a feasible belief status set. Such a set indicates not
only what the agent’s permitted, obligatory and forbidden actions are, but also spec-
ifies what the agent believes to be the permitted, obligatory and forbidden actions of
other agents are. We have then refined the concept of a feasible belief status set to
two more fine grained semantics – namely the rational belief status set semantics,
and the reasonable belief status set semantics.
Finally, we have provided a transformation that takes as input, a map and con-
verts it into an ordinary agent program, together with a sansightly modified version
of the integrity constraints and object state. The feasible (respectively, rational, rea-
sonable) belief status sets of the map are shown to be in a one-one correspondence
with the belief-free feasible (respectively, rational, reasonable) status sets of the trans-
formed agent progam with modified integrity constraints and object state. This result
is nontrivial, and makes it possible to implement maps through a computation engine
for feasible (respectively, rational, reasonable) status sets of agent programs. We have
currently developed a preliminary implementation of a computation engine for agent
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programs, and are currently refining it. Some sample screendumps of this engine may
be seen at http://www.cs.umd.edu/

vs/agent/impact.html.
As beliefs that an agent a may hold about another agent b may be uncertain, we
are currently extending the current work on maps to handle probabilistic modes of
uncertainty. We are also extending maps so that agent a can estimate what agent
b may do in the future, and to reason about how agent b’s beliefs may evolve in
the future.
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Appendix A. Agent programs without beliefs
The following definitions are taken from Ref. [21].
A.1. Feasible, rational and reasonable semantics
Definition 60 (Status set). A status set is any set S of ground action status atoms
over S. For any operator Op 2 fP;Do ;F;O;Wg, we denote by OpS the set
OpS  fa j Opa 2 Sg.
Definition 61 (Deontic and action consistency). A status set S is called deontically
consistent, if, by definition, it satisfies the following rules for any ground action a:
• If Oa 2 S, then Wa 62 S
• If Pa 2 S, then Fa 62 S
• If Pa 2 S, then OS  9Prea, where 9Prea denotes the existential closure of
Prea, i.e., all free variables in Prea are governed by an existential quantifier.
This condition means that the action a is in fact executable in the state OS.
A status set S is called action consistent, if S;OS AC holds.
Besides consistency, we also wish that the presence of certain atoms in S entails
the presence of other atoms in S. For example, if Oa is in S, then we expect that
Pa is also in S, and if Oa is in S, then we would like to have Doa in S. This is cap-
tured by the concept of deontic and action closure.
Definition 62 (Deontic and action closure). The deontic closure of a status S, denoted
D-Cl S, is the closure of S under the rule
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• If Oa 2 S, then Pa 2 S,
where a is any ground action. We say that S is deontically closed, if S  D-Cl S
holds.
The action closure of a status set S, denoted A-Cl S, is the closure of S under the
rules
• If Oa 2 S, then Doa 2 S
• If Doa 2 S, then Pa 2 S
where a is any ground action. We say that a status S is action-closed, if S  A-Cl S
holds.
The following straightforward results shows that status sets that are action-closed
are also deontically closed, i.e.,
Definition 63 (Operator AppP;OSS). Suppose P is an agent program, and OS is an
agent state. Then, AppP;OSSis defined to be the set of all ground action status atoms
A such that there exists a rule in P having a ground instance of the form r :
A L1; . . . ; Ln such that
1. Basr  S and ::Bÿasr \ S  ;, and
2. every code call v 2 Bccr succeeds in OS, and
3. every code call v 2 ::Bÿccr does not succeed in OS, and
4. for every atom Opa 2 Br [ fAg such that Op 2 fP;O;Dog, the action a is
executable in state OS.
Note that part (4) of the above definition only applies to the ‘‘positive’’ modes
P;O;Do . It does not apply to atoms of the form Fa as such actions are not executed,
nor does it apply to atoms of the form Wa, because execution of an action might be
(vacuously) waived, if its prerequisites are not fulfilled.
Our approach is to base the semantics of agent programs on consistent and closed
status sets. However, we have to take into account the rules of the program as well as
integrity constraints. This leads us to the notion of a feasible status set.
Definition 64 (Feasible status set). Let P be an agent program and let OS be an
agent state. Then, a status set S is a feasible status set for P on OS, if the following
conditions hold:
(S1) (closure under the program rules) AppP;OSS  S;
(S2) (deontic and action consistency) S is deontically and action consistent;
(S3) (deontic and action closure) S is action closed and deontically closed;
(S4) (state consistency) O0S  IC, where O0S  applyDo S;OS is the state
which results after taking all actions in Do S on the state OS.
Definition 65 (Groundedness; rational status set). A status set S is grounded, if there
exists no status set S 0 6 S such that S0  S and S0 satisfies conditions (S1)–(S3) of a
feasible status set.
A status set S is a rational status set, if S is a feasible status set and S is grounded.
Definition 66 (Reasonable status set). Let P be an agent program, let OS be an agent
state, and let S be a status set.
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1. If P is a positive agent program, then S is a reasonable status set for P on OS, if
and only if S is a rational status set for P on OS.
2. The reduct of P wrt. S and OS, denoted by redSP;OS, is the program which is
obtained from the ground instances of the rules in P over OS as follows.
(a) First, remove every rule r such that Bÿasr \ S 6 ;;
(b) Remove all atoms in Bÿasr from the remaining rules.
Then S is a reasonable status set for P wrt. OS, if it is a reasonable status set of the
program redSP;OS with respect to OS.
Appendix B. Agents in RAMP
B.1. tank Agents
B.1.1. Code Calls
1. Drive forward at speed Speed (0 to Max speed)
tank : goForwardSpeed ! Boolean
2. Drive backward at speed Speed (0 to Max speed)
tank : goBackwardSpeed
3. Turn left by Degrees degrees (0 to 360)
tank : turnLeftDegrees
4. Turn right by Degrees degrees (0 to 360)
tank : turnRightDegrees
5. Determine current position in 2D
tank : getPos  ! 2DPoint
6. Get current heading
tank : getHeading  ! Heading
7. Aim the gun at 3D point Point
tank : aimPoint ! Boolean
8. Fire the gun using the current aim
tank : fire  ! Boolean
9. Compute the distance between two 2D points
tank : computeDistanceX; Y ! Distance
10. Retrieve the maximum range for the gun
tank : getMaxGunRange  ! Distance
11. Calculate the next position of the tank when driving with Speed from
CurrentLocation tank : calculateNextPosCurrentLocation;Speed! 2DPoint
B.1.2. Actions
1. Drive from to 2D point From to 2D point To at speed Speed
Name: driveFrom; To; Speed
Pre : inFrom; tank : getPos 
Del : inFrom; tank : getPos 
Add: inCurrentLocation; tank : getPos &
inTo; tank : calculateNextPosCurrentLocation; Speed
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2. Drive route Route given as a sequence of 2D points at speed Speed
Name : driveRouteRoute; Speed
Pre : inRoute0:Pos; tank : getPos 
Del : inRoute0:Pos; tank : getPos 
Add:
inRouteRoute:Count:Pos; code call
where code call is
tank : calculateNextPosRouteRoute:Countÿ 1:Pos; Speed:
3. Attack vehicle at position Pos from position MyPos
Name: attackMyPos; Pos
Pre: inMyPos; tank : getPos &
inDistance; tank : computeDistanceMyPos; Pos&
inmaxRange; tank : getMaxGunRange &Distance < maxRange
Del :fg
Add: fg
B.2. Terrain route planning agent
B.2.1. Code calls
1. Sets current map to Map
route : useMapMap ! Boolean
2. Compute a route plan on the current map for a vehicle of type VehicleType from
SourcePoint to DestPoint given in 2D. Returns a route plan as a sequence of
points in plane.
route : getPlanSourcePoint; DestPoint; VehicleType !
SequenceOf2DPoints
3. Given SourcePoint and DestPoint on the current map, determine the likely
routes of a vehicle of type VehicleType whose initial route segment is Route,
given as a sequence of points in the plane It returns a sequence of route-proba-
bility pairs.
route : groundPlanSourcePoint; DestPoint; VehicleType; Route!
Route; Prob
4. Compute a flight plan on the current map from SourcePoint to DestPoint given
in 3D. Returns a flight plan as a sequence of points in spaceroute : flightPlan
SourcePoint; DestPoint ! SequenceOf3DPoints
5. Determines whether two points are visible from each other on the given map. For
example if a hill lies between the two points, they are not visible from each other.
This is useful to determine whether an agent can see another agent or whether an
agent can fire upon another agent.
route : visibleMap; Point1; Point2 ! Boolean
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B.2.2. Actions
1. Compute a route plan on map Map for a vehicle of type VehicleType from
SourcePoint to DestPoint given in 2D.
Name: planRouteMap; SourcePoint; DestPoint; VehicleType
Pre : SourcePoint 6 DestPoint
Del : fg
Add: intrue; route : useMapMap&
inPlan; route : getPlanSourcePoint; DestPoint; VehicleType
2. Given SourcePoint and DestPoint on map Map determine the likely routes of a
vehicle of type VehicleType whose initial route segment is Route, given as a se-
quence of points in the plane
Name: evaluateGroundPlanMap; SourcePoint; DestPoint;
VehicleType; Route
Pre : SourcePoint 6 DestPoint
Del : fg
Add: intrue; route : useMapMap&
inRP; route : groundPlanSourcePoint; DestPoint; VehicleType; Route
3. Compute a flight plan on map Map from SourcePoint to DestPoint given in 3D.
Name: planFlightMap; SourcePoint; DestPoint
Pre : SourcePoint 6 DestPoint
Del : fg
Add : intrue; route : useMapMap&
inPlan; route : flightPlanSourcePoint; DestPoint
B.3. Tracking agent
This agent continuousansy scans the area for enemy vehicles. It maintains a list of
enemy vehicles, assigning each an agent id. It tries to determine the vehicle type for
each enemy vehicle. When it detects a new vehicle, it adds it to its list, together with
its position. Since the tracking agent only keeps track of enemy vehicles which are
on the ground, the position is in the plane. This could be for example an AWACS
plane.
B.3.1. Code calls
1. Get position for agent with id AgentId
track : getPosAgentId ! 2DPoint
2. Get the type of agent for agent with id AgentId. It returns the most likely vehicle
type together with the probability
track : getTypeOfAgentAgentId ! VehicleType; Prob
3. Return the list of all agents being tracked
track : getListOfAgents  ! ListOfAgentIdsF
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B.4. Coordination agent
B.4.1. Code calls
1. Determine wether a vehicle of type VehicleType1 at position Pos1 can attack a
vehicle of type VehicleType2 at position Pos2. For example a tank is not able to
attack a fighter plane unless it is on the ground.
coord : canBeAttackedNowVehicleType1; Pos1; VehicleType2; Pos2 !
Boolean
2. Given an agent id for an enemy vehicle, determine the best position, time and
route for an attack to be successful. Return the estimated probability of success
coord : findAttackTimeAndPosAgentId ! Pos; Time; Route; Prob
3. Given a set of ids for friendly agents, compute a plan for a coordinated attack
against the enemy agent with id EnemyId. The friendly agents participating in
the coordinated attack are taken from the set SetOfAgentIds
coord : coordinatedAttackSetOfAgentIds; EnemyId ! AttackPlan
B.4.2. Actions
1. Given a set of ids for friendly agents, compute a plan for a coordinated attack
against the enemy agent with id EnemyId. The friendly agents participating in
the coordinated attack are taken from the set SetOfAgentIds.
Name: attackSetOfAgentIds; EnemyId
Pre : SetOfAgentIds 6 ;
Del : fg
Add: inAP; coord : coordinatedAttackSetOfAgentIds; EnemyId
B.5. helicopter Agents
B.5.1. Code calls
1. Change flying altitude to Altitude (0 to Maximum altitude)
heli : setAltitudeAltitude ! Boolean
2. Get current altitude
heli : getAltitude  ! Altitude
3. Change flying speed to Speed (0 to Maximum speed)
heli : setSpeedSpeed ! Boolean
4. Get current speed
heli : getSpeed  ! Speed
5. Change flying heading to Heading (0 to 360)
heli : setHeadingHeading ! Boolean
6. Get current heading
heli : getHeading  ! Heading
7. Aim the gun at the 3D point given by Pos
heli : aimPos ! Boolean
8. Fire the gun using the current aim
heli : fire  ! Boolean
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9. Determine the current position in space
heli : getPos  ! 3DPoint
10. Compute heading to fly from 2D point Src to 2D point Dst
heli : computeHeadingSrc; Dst ! Heading
11. Compute the distance between two 3D points
heli : computeDistanceX; Y ! Distance
12. Retrieve the maximum range for the gun
heli : getMaxGunRange  ! Distance
13. Calculate the next position of the helicopter given its CurrentPos, its Speed and
flying Angle
heli : calculateNextPosCurrentPos; Speed ! 3DPoint
B.5.2. Actions
1. Fly from 3D point From to 3D point To at altitude Altitude and with speedSpeed
Name: flyFrom; To; Altitude; Speed
Pre :finFrom; heli : getPos 
Del : inFrom; heli : getPos 
Add: inCurrentPos; heli : getPos &
inTo; heli : calculateNextPosCurrentPos; Speed
2. FlyRoutepath Path given as a sequence of quadraples consisting of: a 3D point,
altitude, speed and angle
Name: flyRoutePath
Pre :finPath0:Pos; heli : getPos 
Del : inPath0:Pos; heli : getPos 
Add: inPathPath:Count:Pos; code call;where code call is
heli : calculateNextPosPathPath:Countÿ 1:Pos; Speed
3. Attack vehicle at position Pos in space from position MyPos
Name: attackMyPos; Pos
Pre: inMyPos; heli : getPos &
inDistance; heli : computeDistanceMyPos; Pos&
inmaxRange; heli : getMaxGunRange &Distance < maxRange
Del :
Add :
B.5.3. Integrity constraints
inS; heli : getSpeed   - S < maxSpeed
inA; heli : getAltitude   - A < maxAltitude
B.5.4. Action constraints
ffly plane1X1; Y1; A1; S1; fly plane2X2; Y2; A2; S2g - Y1  Y2
fattackPg - inP; heli1 : getPos 
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fattackPg - inP; heli2 : getPos 
fattackPg - inP; heli3 : getPos 
fattackPg - inP; heli4 : getPos 
where heli1; . . . ; heli4 are the friendly agents of the agent in question.
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